

## European approach to promote democracy in the Arab region after Arab spring

Reçu le: 02/10/2020

Accepté le: 01/06/2021

Zanouda Mouna \*  
Biskra University- Algeria  
m.zanouda@univ-biskra.dz

### Abstract:

The purpose of this paper is to outline the role of the European Union in supporting and promoting democracy in arab countries. Especially by tracking various initiatives and agreements that link the Union with the arab countries like the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, European Neighborhood policy.... achieving to

\* - Corresponding author.

the after 2011 period or which is called the arab spring.

We have found through this study that the EU after 2011 has decided to resend its projects about reform and democracy issues in the arab world especially the so called the New-Neighborhood policy of 2015.

Through this policy, the EU has changed the taken model of supporting democracy to a governance model based on multi-sectoral partnerships.

**Keywords:** European Union; Democracy promotion; Arab spring; Democratization models; Gouvernance model.

### Introduction:

European Union is the greatest partner of the Arab countries in many fields: commercial, economic, even political and security ... Those relationships have developed historically, especially according to the relations that bind the two sides of the Mediterranean sea since the colonial era.

The European-Arabian relations are based on a variant agreements and platforms that helps to develop the political statement at the arab world. These agreements affirmed in terms of their objectives and mechanisms that political and security issues are too related in accordance to the expansion of security notion and the variety of risks. Especially in the post-Arab Spring period, and the political transformations then security challenges they presented to the Mediterranean region as a whole. this is what leads us to question about:

What is the role that the European Union is playing to support democracy in Arab countries, especially in the post-Arab Spring

period?

**Chapter I: The European-arabian relations: different initiatives but same goals**

In order to strengthen its relations with the arab countries, European Union (EU) set up many cooperation agreements which has developed historically as following :

**1- The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership:**

After the cold war and the establishment of the european union through Maastricht treaty in 1995, the union aims to develop and strengthen its relations with the south side of the mediterranean in order to create a more secure area for europe.

The (EMP) was established through Barcelona Process in 1995, targeted for the establishment of the Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010, it also invites co-operation on a broad range of political, social and economic affairs<sup>(1)</sup>.

Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements included: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Turkey (except Syria and Libya). This partnership aims to establish a common area of peace, stability, and shared prosperity in the region. EU-Southern Mediterranean relations at bilateral level are managed mainly through the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements<sup>(2)</sup>.

The Euro-Mediterranean partnership include also cooperations in security and political issues which include: respecting human rights, democracy, religious and cultural tolerance, developing human resources, encouraging exchanges between civil societies...Chapter 1 of the Barcelona declaration envisaged political and security cooperation to establish a common area of peace and stability, Chapter 2 planned to establish an economic and financial partnership in order to create an area of shared prosperity (including a free trade area); and Chapter 3 anticipated the enhancement of social and cultural ties, to develop human resources, promote understanding between cultures and facilitate interaction at the level of civil society<sup>(3)</sup>.

This partnership could not understand as giving the south side of the mediterranean countries the membership in the union. Since regional integration according to its theorists is based on geographical, political and social homogeneity...These characteristics are not available in the relationships between the two partners.



In fact the word ‘partnership’ refers to new formal relations established with an individual country and group of countries<sup>(4)</sup>. It can also be understood according to its goals, the European move is dominated by "security obsession" factor and the risks of instability in the Mediterranean area on several levels: demographic pressure, illegal immigration, the religious extremism, the emergence of Islamist groups, organized crime. Thus, the partnership can be understood as a kind of collective assumption of responsibility for security in the region, as Bichara Khader believe here that «the Barcelona Process was not to promote reform in the Southern Mediterranean but to promote “order” and “stability”»<sup>(5)</sup>.

In addition, concerning the European policies toward immigration issues in the EMP was criticised as being a vehicle for Europeans to control the flow of migrants by "throwing money at the problem" rather than addressing the needs of Europe’s Arab neighbours in objective terms<sup>(6)</sup>.

## **2- The European Neighbourhood Policy:**

The European Neighborhood Policy was designed to adapt the enlargement process that the European Union witnessed, especially from the East, where many Eastern European countries were annexed in 2004, as an adaptive policy to the new geopolitical space of the Union.

European Neighborhood Policy known as "ENP" was adopted by the European Union to replace the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership after 2007, in order to activate its relations with the neighbors in the eastern Europe and the south of the Mediterranean sea. This agreement involves activating the political aspect of Europe's relations with its neighbors emphasising on the need to adopt political reforms.

The main objective of the "ENP" policy is to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all. It is based on the values of democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights<sup>(7)</sup>. In general the "ENP" has four key objectives which are<sup>(8)</sup>:

- Promoting sustainable development in regions on both sides of common borders.
- Working together through joint actions to address common challenges, in fields such as environment, public health, and the



prevention from and fight against organised crime.

- Ensuring efficient and secure common borders through joint actions.
- Promoting local cross-border "people-to-people" type actions.

The arab countries which are related to the ENP under the Southern Neighbourhood policy, it includes ten partner countries: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia<sup>(9)</sup>. Those countries are implemented through bilateral, regional, neighbourhood-wide and Cross-Border co-operation programmes. and also cover a wide range of sectors; including democratic development, rule of law and good governance; state building; economic development; social protection; and migration<sup>(10)</sup>.

For operational reasons the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument ENPI was created to give the financial assistance to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Partner Countries, it operated since January 2007 replacing the MEDA instrument that was supporting the Euro-Med Partnership. This instrument was funded by almost €12 billion for the period 2007-2013 in order to reach its goals<sup>(11)</sup>. During 2007 – 2013, the EU has made available a total of over €9 billion especially for the Southern Neighbourhood region (including the arab countries).

The ENPI was undertaking through a number of innovative components and tools which give further substance to the EU aim of avoiding new dividing lines<sup>(12)</sup> :

- Cross Border Co-operation (CBC) under which it finances joint programmes bringing together regions of EU member states and partner countries sharing a common border. CBC is co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Two types of programmes are established: bilateral programmes covering a common land border (or short sea crossing), and multilateral programmes covering the Mediterranean regions.
- The Governance Facility which provides additional resources to those partners that have proved their will to carry forward essential reforms agreed in their Action Plans. An indicative €50 million per year have been set aside for this component.
- The Twinning initiative and the TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange) instrument which encourage co-operation



between the public administration of a partner country and the equivalent institution of a member state, aiming to upgrade and modernize institutions in the beneficiary states.

- the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) funds projects of common interest, focusing primarily on energy, environment and transport. The EC allocated €700 million to the Facility, for the period 2007-2013.

The first observation can be marked here is the European Union's interest in the issue of reform ; by giving benefits to the countries that have made rapid progress in economic and political reforms, in order to make an incentive for them to go on that path, while preventing them from laggards. On the other hand, we observe a lack of the penalties for violators and real follow-up of the programs, which reflects the real interest in the issues of reform and democratization. And stresses in contrast that security concerns are more important than political ones for the European Union.

### **3- Union for the Mediterranean:**

Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is a continuation of the Barcelona process. It was initially launched as part of the election campaign of former French President Nicolas Sarkozy. It was designed in order to promote integration across 15 neighbours to the EU's south in North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans.

The union (UfM) was launched in 2008 as an opportunity to maintain a platform for political dialogue and making relations more operational, with the initiation of new regional and sub-regional projects in many areas such as economy, environment, energy, health, migration, education and social affairs<sup>(13)</sup>.

The UfM encompasses of member States of the European Union, the European Commission and 15 Mediterranean countries, (a total of 43 UfM member states) nine of them are Arab states which are: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Palestine and Syria.

Union business is formally managed by its members which meet on a regular basis at the level of Senior Officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the 43 countries, EU institutions and the League of Arab States. The meetings are chaired by a co-presidency, one from the European Union side and the other from the Mediterranean side<sup>(14)</sup>.



According to European data, the Union for the Mediterranean aims to play an important role in improving the lives of people in the Euro-Mediterranean region by implementing practical and concrete projects within six strategic priority areas, which are<sup>(15)</sup> :

- business development.
- social and civil affairs.
- higher education and research.
- transport and urban development.
- water and environment.
- energy and climate action.

The first observation which can be concluded here is the predominance of the social and economic nature of areas of interest, in contrast we observe an almost complete absence of political and legal files. The same thing we notice through The UfM s key Flagships on its agenda<sup>(16)</sup>:

- the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, including coastal and protected marine areas;
- the establishment of maritime and land highways that connect ports and improve rail connections so as to facilitate movement of people and goods;
- a joint civil protection programme on prevention, preparation and response to natural and man-made disasters;
- a Mediterranean solar energy plan that explores opportunities for developing alternative energy sources in the region;
- a Euro-Mediterranean University, inaugurated in Slovenia in June 2008;
- the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative, which supports small businesses operating in the region by first assessing their needs and then providing technical assistance and access to finance.

The Union for the Mediterranean can be considered as a project to deepen and continue the goals of the Barcelona Process in a more serious and operational manner, which is based on an equal partnership between all partners within the framework of the Union concept. But in reality it has not achieved a great performance compared to its objectives, this is due to the nature of the areas covered in the process Co-operation, which is considered limited



compared to the EMP. Moreover ; the idea of a union based on equal rights between all parties is considered unrealistic, because the union exists between different partners politically, economically and even structurally, the political weight of the countries of the European Union -which act in union- differ from the Arab countries which act unilaterally. This will of course Weakens its negotiating role and even participation in the projects of the Union, and this may justify the shy participation of Arab countries in the programs and meetings of the Union.

This can be proven through the transformation of the union from a “unifying project” into a “union of projects”– and the change that emerged when the Mediterranean Union became the Union for the Mediterranean<sup>(17)</sup>.

## **Chapter II: European democracy promoting after the arab spring**

Since late 2010 and early 2011, many Arab countries witnessed massive popular protests calling for a change in the country's economic and political conditions. It starts from Tunisia where the Tunisian youth revolted against the regime of Ben Ali and its policies ... and ultimately led to the overthrow of the regime. Many other Arab countries also witnessed similar protests, which in many of them led to major political transformations which differ in intensity between: political and constitutional reform in both Algeria and Morocco, the overthrow of the regime and the beginning of a political conflict that has not yet been resolved, as in the case in each From Syria, Libya, and even Yemen.

The European Union tried to engineer well for its reactions to transformations in the Arab region, especially as it posed deeper challenges in political and security issues for Europe. Perhaps first challenges posed were the waves of mass immigration that set out from many Arab countries towards Europe, in many of them demanded the right for Political refugee.

These transformations also led to the falling of some political regimes that were considered allies of Europe in the past, in exchange for the emergence of the political Islamist movement in these countries. Those transformations proved on the other hand that the demand for a transition towards democracy has become more than a necessity in the Arab world, this transition will be led by youth and



civil society, not by the political regimes that Europe relied on in the past.

In response to the emerging challenges, Former High Representative Catherine Ashton announced in February 2011 that there should be a “fundamental review” of the (ENP). The version of ENP issued in 2011 consequently articulated a threefold strategy: building deep democracy, securing economic development, and facilitating people-to-people contact.<sup>(18)</sup>

The official version of the revised (ENP) was not issued until November 2015 for reasons that can be identified in the wait and see policy, through which the European Union announced that: « The EU cannot alone solve the many challenges of the region, and there are limits to its leverage, but the new ENP will play its part in helping to create the conditions for positive development.<sup>(19)</sup> »

Under the revised ENP, stabilisation of the region in political, economic, and security related terms, are the heart of the new policy. Moreover, it puts a strong emphasis on two principles: the implementation of a differentiated approach to Neighbours, to respect the different aspirations of partners and to better answer EU interests and the interests of partners; and an increased ownership by partner countries and Member States<sup>(20)</sup>. Concerning promoting democracy, the revised ENP identify four main domains as the heart of the new Policy<sup>(21)</sup>: Good governance ; democracy ; rule of law and human rights ; economic development for stabilisation ; security ; migration and mobility.

Three key elements characterized the new ENP :

The first, is to encourage the political reforms through the so-called 'more for more' principle, whereby additional reform efforts by partner countries were to be rewarded with additional financial and other support<sup>(22)</sup>. In this context, the European Union was approved that these results has not proven a sufficiently strong incentive to create a commitment to reform, where there is no political will.

The second concerns the "differentiation approach" introduced in the new policy, this regulation outlined for the first time that the partner country « shall be differentiated » in form and amounts according to the partner country's commitment to reforms and its progress in building deep and sustainable democracy. The regulation

also demarcated for the first-time measures for imposing negative conditionality, that is, the partial suspension of the Union's support to a partner country that "fails to observe the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms"<sup>(23)</sup>

The third is to strengthen and promote the role of civil society actors in reforms and democratic changes taking place in the Neighbourhood countries. In particular local civil society organisations and their capacity to engage with public authorities are being strengthened<sup>(24)</sup>. the EU decided to shape its focus on the engagement with civil, economic and social actors in order to explore more effective ways to make its case for fundamental reforms with partners<sup>(25)</sup>.

In order to provide financial support to partners, The new European Neighbourhood Instrument(ENI) has been created and strengthened with over 15 billion EUR for 2014-2020<sup>(26)</sup>.

In addition, the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) was established as an independent, grant-making organisation, established in 2013 as an autonomous International Trust Fund to foster democracy in the European Neighbourhood<sup>(27)</sup>. This organisation was created in order to support civil society organisations, pro-democracy movements, civic and political activists...and even democratic political system, it can also include newly created or non-registered organisations, informal platforms, youth groups and individuals ; « In particular, EED supports those who cannot be supported by other donors and existing EU instruments. Support is contingent on adherence to democratic values, respect for human rights and observance of principles of non-violence <sup>(28)</sup>».

In the realisation of these new policies, many Arab countries benefited of a large amount of financial supplies. Tunisia for example is considered as the principal beneficiary country in the Southern Neighbourhood. Since its Consolidation of the 'umbrella programme'(the "more for more" incentive mechanism) of the European Union which lends in recognition of progress made in the field of democracy and human rights. Tunisian new government benefited of a combination of grants (over EUR 1.2 billion), macro financial assistance (MFA – EUR 800 million) and loans, including those from the European Investment Bank (EUR 1.5 billion), will



bring total support to Tunisia from 2011 to 2016 to approximately EUR 3.5 billion according to the European commission<sup>(29)</sup>, This also includes 85 projects co-funded by the EU and implemented by civil society organisations, worth EUR 41 million<sup>(30)</sup>. This significant progress in the tunisian –European relations include many areas in trade relations, security sector reforms, education, research and innovation.

Finally, we can say that the european union through these new policies has shifted its interests from official regimes to the non governmental actor and civil society. Europe is awared after the arab spring that betting on official political systems is useless in the issue of reform, and that the political and security situation in the Arab world is no longer isolated from its political and social environment, with the participation of various actors. Consequently, old policies such as partnership and neighborhood policy are no longer useful under the new circumstances. And here we can say that Europe has become in a stage of embarrassment between its strategic interests, which cannot be achieved without official partners, and between the new societal actors that have become demanding for change and participation, as they also represent a threat to Europe through illegal immigration .

### **Chapter III: The european approach to promote democracy in the Arab world: a critical view**

The Union's approach to democracy promotion falls into three distinctive models: linkage, leverage and governance :

The first model is linkage: consists of activities that tackle the societal preconditions for democracy and give support to the democratic opposition and other civil society actors in the target countries, this model has been a constant in EU external policies since the early support to democratic transitions in Latin America in the 1980s<sup>(31)</sup> .

Leverage model: induces democratic reforms via political conditionality, this model has became dominant in european policies in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. This model is conducted through intergovernmental co-operation between the EU and third country governments and applies political conditionality to engage in democratic reforms .

Governance model: which is a policy-specific functional cooperation with third countries, this model started becoming more prominent in the early 2000s in the context of the neighbourhood policy (ENP) which seeks to promote neighbouring countries' approximation to the EU's system of rules below the threshold of membership<sup>(32)</sup>.

These models differ according to its targets, linkage model targets democracy promotion through political processes such as: the electoral regime, the separation of powers, and respect for individual rights and civil liberties... On the other hand, it may operate at the level of society and target the socio-economic preconditions for democratization, including economic growth, education, the spread of liberal values, and the organization of civil society and the public sphere(The leverage model), this model is conducted mainly by official channells at the level of the government. Finally, democracy promotion may also target sectors: the policy-specific governance regimes – such as environmental policy, market regulation, welfare regimes, or internal security(the governance model)<sup>(33)</sup>. and it depends on the official and informal partners in a multilateral policy in The framework of the so-called good governance.

By tracing the development of relations between the European Union and the Arab countries, especially since 1990, we found that the various European Union policies were taken with these mentioned models.

Both the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the neighborhood policy were based on official bilateral relations between the Arab partners, and paid less attention to the informal parties. Whereas, the European Union tried to rely more on the multi-level governance model, especially after the Arab Spring revolutions and the changes that were accompanied by the transformations that led to the emergence of informal influences from civil society as well as youth as actors to achieve a true transformation towards participatory democracy.

From a critical and evaluation point of view the European Union's pro-democracy policies in the Arab world can be evaluated on two basic levels :

On the level of goals: The economic and security objectives have always been the focus of the European Union's interest in managing



its relations with Arab partners. Arab countries, according to Europe, represent on the one hand a supplier of various raw materials and energy, as well as a large open market for European products .... And on the other hand, the Arab region is considered as an area of great international competition, American, Russian, Turkish ... and therefore the various aforementioned policies can be considered as a European attempt to ensure Arab connection and subordination to Europe.

In addition, The ENP has always been considered to have purely security objectives. Europe's main goal is to create a circle of friends and partners to guard European borders in the east and south. Especially concerning immigration issues, this led to the so called «the democratization-securitization dilemma» which mean that the EU has always give priority to his security then the political reform<sup>(34)</sup>.

In terms of tools: The adoption of European Union policies on the principle of conditionality as a mechanism to advance and strengthen democracy within the framework of the incentive or support model is not sufficient to achieve real reform. The principle of conditionality appears to be a process of selling the principles of democracy in exchange for financial incentives without concern for real reform that is linked to the political will of the ruling elites. Dr Bishara Khader questioned here «how can the EU contribute to democratisation of authoritarian regimes with their own will?»<sup>(35)</sup>.

Those criticisms led the European Union to renew its policies by focusing on democratic governance model . The European Union's tendency to adopt the model of good governance in its relations with the Arab countries (its neighbors) is considered one of the outcomes of the Arab Spring revolutions. these revolutions prove that true democracy is produced from within.

On the other hand, it also proved that all old policies of the European union which were mainly based on the linkage model, these initiatives were not able to achieve a real shift towards democracy in the Arab countries. Perhaps the economic, political and social reasons that led to the emergence of popular protests in many Arab countries at the beginning of 2011 is the most prominent evidence of the failure of European Union policies.

This matter prompted the European Union to adopt a third model within the framework of the revised Neighborhood Policy of 2015 (the



governance model) based on establishing cooperation agreements and partnerships in various sectors such as environmental policy, market regulation, welfare regimes, or internal security<sup>(36)</sup>.

Perhaps the results of this new policy is still too early to talk about it, however, it is clear that this model can be considered as a strategy to avoid dealing with political issues such as elections, separation of powers... and focusing instead on the administrative, social and environmental dimensions of good governance, which are in fact the main concern of the EU toward its surrounding environment.

We can suppose here that the new policy of the European Union is a jump on the political conditions for democracy, since it considered them as difficult and sensitive field also an internal concern for the arab states. In contrast the European Union decided to focus mainly on its actual interests, which constitute the new neighborhood policy agenda such as economic development, immigration, environment issues...

In addition, the financing policy pursued by the European Union in its various policies, even the new neighborhood policy, which depends on providing financial support to finance projects, support civil society institutions, and the reward policy "more for more" are all policies that suggest that democracy is bought with money and can only be achieved by providing financial support to various Parties in exchange for reform and commitment to it. But the promotion of democracy, in fact, requires deeper measures than that, as the social, cultural, and even administrative and legal requirements of the democratic culture are much more important than the material and financial side.

Finally, we affirm that no matter how different the policies and tools for implementing these policies in relation to the European Union, the interests and concerns of the member states of the Union remain the basic and guiding factor for Euro-Arab relations in its various forms. We also affirm, in this context, that the trend towards strengthening democracy in Arab countries can only be achieved with motives and internal forces convinced of the necessity of democratic reform.

### **Conclusion:**

At the end of this study, we conclude that the processes democracy promoting for Europe have evolved especially since the end of the



Cold War. These policies differed in terms of their tools, mechanisms, and even their partners, but they did not differ in terms of their objectives. As the European Union has maintained its main objectives from its relations with Arab countries, which centered around searching for markets to promote European products, searching for raw materials and energy sources ... and most importantly, security objectives related to combating terrorism, organized crime and immigration. All of this within the framework of what the Union declared in creating a safe and stable neighborhood.

Consequently, the political objectives related to supporting democracy and good governance remain a subordinate objectives to the previous goals, perhaps the most important here is the ineffectiveness of the mechanisms used to support reform and democracy in the region, which rely mainly on the logic of financing without focusing on the social and cultural dimensions required for a true transition towards democracy.

Regarding the Arab case, the experiences of democratic transformation in the region have proven that even with the constitution's adoption of the principles of democracy and the establishment and financial support of various civil society institutions will not serve and support democracy, since the conviction and understanding of the concept of democracy and its mechanism still absent. However the experiences of established democracies in Europe and the United States of America have proven that these legal and institutional mechanisms (on which the European Union is betting) are nothing but the outcome of the human struggle to devote rights, freedoms and faith in the culture of democracy on the other hand.

**Notes:**

(1)- Fulvio Attina, «The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: The Realist and Liberal Views», *European Foreign Affairs Review* ;N: 8. 2003. P: 182.

(2)- European commossion, «Countries and regions: Euro-Mediterranean partnership», consulted: 08/09/2020, (20.00), web site: <https://cutt.us/0fORB>

(3)- Hollis, R, «No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the Arab Spring», *International Affairs*.n: 88. (2012). p: 05.

(4)- Fulvio Attina, op.cited. p: 181.

(5)- Bichara Khader, «The European Union and the Arab World: from the Rome Treaty to the Arab Spring». Paper presented at the EuroMeSCo Annual Conference

“Europe, the Mediterranean and the Arab Spring: Crisis as an Opportunity”, held in Barcelona on 4th and 5th October 2012. p 24.

<sup>(6)</sup>- Hollis, R, op.cited. p: 6

<sup>(7)</sup>- European commission, «European Neighbourhood Policy», consulted: 10/09/2020. (20: 30), Web site: <https://cutt.us/3l8rO>

<sup>(8)</sup>- Commission of the European communities, «European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy paper». Brussels, 12.5.2004. P: 27.

<sup>(9)</sup>- European commission, «Southern Neighbourhood», consulted: 10/09/2020. (21: 15), Web site: <https://cutt.us/QM8gn>

<sup>(10)</sup>- Ibid.

<sup>(11)</sup>- «European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI)», consulted: 10/09/2020 ;(16: 00), web site: <https://cutt.us/KQdhs>

<sup>(12)</sup>- Ibid.

<sup>(13)</sup>- « UfM: Relaunching the Barcelona Process », consulted 12/09/2020. (09: 00), Web site: <https://cutt.us/B15kU>

<sup>(14)</sup>- European commission, «Mediterranean Neighbourhood», consulted: 12/09/2020. (10: 10), Web site: <https://cutt.us/Y7Mhy>

<sup>(15)</sup>- « UfM: Relaunching the Barcelona Process », op.cited.

<sup>(16)</sup>- European commission, «Mediterranean Neighbourhood», op.cited.

<sup>(17)</sup>- Ahmed Driss, «Putting the Mediterranean Union in Perspective: North-African Perspectives»Euromesco paper, 68, June2008. p: 19.

<sup>(18)</sup>- Shima Hatab, «Deeping democracy or stabilization: European neighborhood policy (ENP) and the“Arab spring”», Review of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 4 No. 1, 2019. P: 21

<sup>(19)</sup>- European commission, «Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy» Brussels, 18.11.2015. p: 2

<sup>(20)</sup>- European commission, «European Neighbourhood Policy», op.cited.

<sup>(21)</sup>- the European External Action Service, «European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)», consulted: 12/09/2020.(20: 18), Web site: <https://cutt.us/OgXu6>

<sup>(22)</sup>- Ibid.

<sup>(23)</sup>- Shima Hatab, op.cited. p: 23.

<sup>(24)</sup>- European commission, « European Neighbourhood Policy », op.cited.

<sup>(25)</sup>- European commission, « Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy » op.cited. p: 5

<sup>(26)</sup>- the European External Action Service, «European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)», op.cited.

<sup>(27)</sup>- European Endowment for Democracy, «About EED », consulted 12/09/2020.(07: 00), web site: <https://cutt.us/T7PKK>

<sup>(28)</sup>- Ibid

<sup>(29)</sup>- European commossion, «Relations between the EU and Tunisia», Consulted: 10/09/2020, (20.00), web site: <https://cutt.us/BdZlz>

<sup>(30)</sup>- Ibid



<sup>(31)</sup>- S. Lavenex and F. Schimmelfennig, «EU Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance», *Democratization*, 18: 4.2011. p: 886.

<sup>(32)</sup>- Ibidem.

<sup>(33)</sup>- Ibid, p: 889.

<sup>(34)</sup>- Bichara Khader, op.cited. P: 31.

<sup>(35)</sup>- Ibidem.

<sup>(36)</sup>- Tina Freyburg, Sandra Lavenex; «Democracy promotion by functional cooperation», In: T. Schumacher, T. Demmelhuber, and A. Marchetti . *Routledge Handbook of the European Neighbourhood Policy*. Routledge, London, 2018, p:5.

