

Analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Algeria's share of the European energy market in light of the Ukrainian crisis.

Abdelhafidlekoui,* 20 aout 1955 university of skikda, Algeria, email: a.lekoui@univ-skikda.dz

SFKE: Startups Financing Lab in light of the Knowledge Economy

Reception: 17/ 08/ 2023

Acceptation: 06/11/2023

Abstract: This study aimed at analyzing the European Union's efforts towards designing a common energy policy due to the growing international needs, the declining European production, the doubts about the reliability of Russian supplies, the rise of energy prices and climate change. These doubts are multiplied by the global epidemic crisis, Covid 19, and became certain after the Russian intervention in Ukraine. the European Union's efforts focused initially on a strategy based on three pillars: competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability.

However, the energy mix and national policy preferences differ greatly among the EU countries. This made it difficult to reach consensus on common priorities and specific goals. Furthermore, the war expanded the range of coordination needs beyond the Atlantic. This is due to the fact that, there, the European Union seeks the assistance of the United States of America to end its energy dependence on Russia through shifting towards a green economy and carbon neutrality or clean energies by 2050. Before that, however, the European Union is obliged to diversify suppliers. Both ways pose opportunities or threats to Algeria. Our study analyzed these opportunities or threats and come up with a number of results.

Keywords: European energy market, energy policy, Ukrainian crisis, Algeria.

JEL classifications codes: N74 ; K32 ; Q34 ; Q47.

I- Introduction:

Though the household sector in Europe just felt an increase in spending on energy since November 2022 in the context of abnormally high temperatures, and the adoption of the terms of the package or the green deal (Le pactevert pour l'Europe, 2019), practically in numbers, gas consumption had partially increased again. With regard to fuels, excellentfuel without lead consumption is high. During December, the sector's demand for energy continued to increase by 0.7% due to the increase in gas consumption despite the decline in electricity consumption. This caused the fourth quarter of the year to record a decline of 5.5% in the total demand for energy, and the smile of quiet autumn is imprinted as a result of sobriety in energy consumption (Tavernier, 2022). With the beginning of 2023, household consumption of energy, whether gas, electricity or even fuel, increased by 4% compared to the end of 2022, leading tothe decrease inthe actual consumption of electricity and gas. During the month of February 2023, an increase of 0.1% compared to January (Tavernier, depenses de consommation des menages en biens, 2023) and in the context of the Ukrainian war, household fuel consumption clearly decreased. Energy security has become a priority issue in the European Union, as it has been shown that it is still difficult to build and operate a common energy policy among the member states, in light of the differences in the components of the mixture of the types of energies preferred by each of them, which prevents the adoption of unified options, priorities and clear procedures for that. This made the European Union's energy strategy successful in terms of sustainability.Yet, the embodiment of a common market and aforeign energy policy still represent great challenges (Möckli, 2008).This matter relates to Algeria's economic interests.

The question of the study:

In light of the prviousliterature, the problem of this study can be formulated in the following basic question:

What are the cards of the Algerian negotiator regarding the energy policies pursued by Europe to confront the repercussions of the Ukrainian war?

This question can be answered through dividing it into three sub-questions:

1. Does the Russian-Ukrainian war pose a threat to energy security in Europe?
2. Any alternative strategies to cope with the potential disruptions to supplies?
3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Algerian alternative?

Hypothesis:

In order to examine the problem and answer its questions, we put forward the following hypotheses:

1. The use of energy as a weapon for geopolitical positioning to force European countries to think pragmatically in bilateral negotiations, threatening the energy security of the old continent.
2. Europe's strategic proposals did not succeed in facing the situation before and during the war. Thus, it turned to transatlantic coordination with the United States of America.
3. Russia's voluntary withdrawal to put pressure on the market, or its presence being limited as a result of sanctions will represent an opportunity for Algeria, which is structurally ready to replace its ally in the market.

The Objectif of the study:

We consider this study as a work of vigilance that sensitises the need to monitor the environment, and to prepare to influence it through arranging the papers of the Algerian negotiator, and through trying to read the thoughts of his interlocutors as competitors and/or as consumers, and to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each party to protect the market share and possibly to expand it.

The importance of the study:

We believe that this study derives its importance from its close connection with an important resource on which the national economy is based and the current transformations in the energy market, not far from our fields with the third largest global importer in a time limit that corresponds to the reaction in the foresight process, i.e. to whom who wants to prepare for the future, this is the most appropriate time to act in relation to the energy transition process, especially in light of the uncertainty created by the conditions of crises and wars.

Methodology:

The study used the descriptive approach to present the state of the European market regarding energy and to describe the reciprocal relationships in the strategies of the various actors.


It also used the analytical approach, extrapolation and conclusion to anticipate the outcome of events, and the directions of strategies adopted by the various parties and their reflections on the matrix of opportunities and threats for Algeria.

II- Background of the study:

Although the matter has been a requirement since the oil crisis of 1973/74, the initiative of European countries was delayed until the current century to replace serious efforts under the pressure of the 2008 financial crisis in the direction of designing a common energy policy in view of the growing international needs, declining European production, doubts about the reliability of Russian supplies, rising prices and energy and climate change. In 2007 the Council of the European Union adopted the “Energy Policy for Europe” (HERZOG, 2016), a strategy based on three pillars: competitiveness, security of supplies and sustainability. However, nothing has emerged from this strategy other than its limits, as the energy mix and national policy preferences differ greatly among the union countries. What

made it difficult to achieve consensus around common priorities and special goals, and the strategic decisions taken until 2013 were limited to sustainability, as the European Union aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 by 20% and increase the share of renewable energies - such as wind energy, solar energy, hydropower and biomass - From 6% to 20% of energy consumption in the European Union. The figure below shows the variation in the energy mix between samples of member states of varying size and relative weight in the union.

Figure 1: Basic energy supply in the European Union and some of its members.



As for the other two pillars, their articles are still conflicting. There is no consensus on the establishment of an internal European market for energy in order to increase competitiveness. There are no strong points for a foreign energy policy to secure supplies.

1- Features of the European energy market:

The efficiency of this market will allow the protection of electricity and gas consumers from price increases, as well as supporting the competitiveness of the European industry and thus will contribute significantly to the achievement of the European energy security, and will create incentives and capabilities for institutions active in the energy field by embodying the huge investments necessary or necessary for the expansion of energy infrastructure for supply and for innovation technology

within the union. Although the easing of the laws (liberalization) of the electricity and gas market began decades ago, the national isolation and the strength of the market concentration formed a distinctive feature. This prompted the European Commission to react with two central proposals (<https://www.dila.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/>, 2021): the first is that those responsible for regulating the energy sector should be given greater powers and work towards increasing competitiveness from through cross-border cooperation. The second is working to dismantle the energy federations vertically integrated to control the market, from producers and suppliers of electricity and gas or operators of transmission and distribution networks. Both proposals were the subject of disagreements. Supportive coordination of national energy regulators remained limited or generated resistance because many member states are unable to force their energy companies - mostly state monopolies - to concede part of their domestic market shares. Many of them are concerned with preserving their dominance in the domestic market at the expense of a competitive European intra-market. In addition, the European legislation on the internal markets is currently limited to preventing the further convergence of national energy unions. Therefore, we can guess that the competitiveness of the European energy market may make a slight improvement in the near future.

2- Security of Supplies:

The European Union imports about 50% of its energy needs, according to the publications of its institutions. It expects its dependence on oil imports to increase from about 80% to 93% by 2030 and from 57% to 84% for natural gas. Note that 27% of oil consumption in the European Union and 30% of oil imports come from Russia, which at the same time supplies 24% of natural gas consumption and 44% of natural gas imports. Europe's dependence on Russian energy is set to continue to grow, especially for natural gas, whose consumption will nearly double over the next 25 years (Möckli, 2008, p. 02). Securing energy supplies in Europe depends on reducing its dependence on imports through internal measures such as increasing the share of alternative and renewable energy sources in the

energy mix, reducing consumption and establishing crisis risk-sharing mechanisms. Since the share of oil and gas will exceed 50% of total energy consumption in the European Union in the foreseeable future, an effective foreign energy policy is also essential. Yet, only little is done in this regard; Many member countries are conducting bilateral negotiations with producing countries. Accordingly, according to the European Commission, the two main challenges to the European Union's foreign energy policy relate to relations with Russia and the issue of diversifying energy import sources.

3- Relations with Russia:

Given its natural resources, Russia will remain the EU's central energy partner. However, especially since the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2006, fears that Moscow will exploit this to achieve political gains in Europe have grown. In fact, energy relations between the EU and Russia are characterized by a high degree of interdependence. Russia is highly dependent on the European energy market. More than 60% of Russian gas and oil exports to Europe, corresponding to 60% of Russian cash revenues, and Russia may depend more on Western technology for energy transfer in the future.


Despite this interdependence, a stable energy relationship has not developed between the EU and Russia. One point of difference relates to the infrastructure for transporting oil and gas. With Russian state corporations beginning to control entire energy supply chains in Europe, the union insists that European firms must also have access to the Russian market. Russia is unlikely to liberalize its domestic market, especially the transport sector. Meanwhile, Moscow's demands for supply contract guarantees and long-term investment opportunities are understandable given the EU's focus on renewables and its diversification efforts, albeit met with regional uncertainty; As shown by the shape of the map of the competing European and Russian gas pipeline projects, intended to wrap a gas belt around southeastern Europe.

Note that Russia did not ratify the Energy Charter of 1994, valid as a multilateral sectoral agreement on trade, transit, investment and environmental aspects directly related to energy, but rather insists on following its basic principles. That is why the European Union should discuss a new bilateral partnership and cooperation agreement to adopt these principles and mechanisms for dispute settlement, which would strengthen the chain of producers, transporters and consumers through the creation of common regulatory areas. However, even if the negotiations were crowned with success, the different degrees of dependence of European countries on Russian gas (from 100% for Bulgaria, Finland, Estonia and Romania to 0% for Great Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), make their interests competing regarding the cooperation of European energy companies with Russian partners, which creates difficulties for the development of a unified energy policy towards Russia.

4- Diversification of suppliers.

The European Union aspires to minimize the potential effects of energy disruptions, and Russia cannot meet Europe's growing energy needs. The bilateral agreements of member states with Russia hindered regional efforts to diversify energy supplies. In fact, it is not enough in this field to simply find reliable producers, but also to build new transportation routes, given the difficulty of storage - unlike oil - which is mainly transported in gas pipelines. The current European gas transportation infrastructure is linked to Russia, Algeria and Norway, i.e. the EU depends on new gas pipelines, until the corresponding LNG operations, terminals and transport vessels show a higher level of sophistication.

Figure 2: Energy sources in the European Union countries.



Source : Politique de sécurité, analyses du CSS, N° 36 juin 2008, p 03.

In this regard, Europe has mainly focused on closer relations with the Caspian Sea states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran. This region has the dual advantage of large untapped gas and oil reserves and the geographical location in the south of Russia which makes it possible to establish direct transport links to Europe. The largest pipeline project in the European Union is the Nabucco pipeline that transports Caspian gas through Turkey to Australia via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, followed by two other major projects, the Turkey-Greece-Italy Gas Pipeline (TGIgti) and the Trans-Adriatic Gas Pipeline (tap) that it will build. EG L, Switzerland, and StatoilHydro; Norway.

Yet rival Russian projects threaten to undermine European projects. Blue Stream is a gas pipeline built by Gazprom and the Italian company ENI that transports gas from Russia to Turkey via the Black Sea. These companies are now also working on the completion of the South Stream gas pipeline project, which aims to bring gas from Russia's Black Sea coast to Greece and from there to southern Italy via a southwestern route as well as to Serbia, Hungary, Austria and northern Italy. via a northwest road. (See Figure 2). Although many experts consider these Russian pipelines

unprofitable, they serve as a political counterweight to Nabucco and undermine the competitiveness of European projects.

Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Serbia have already signed cooperation agreements with Russia. Hungary hopes above all to become a new center for European energy supplies with Russian gas, because such a development would undermine Austria's position as a gas center in Nabucco. For this reason, Vienna is now brandishing the idea of supplying the pipeline with Russian gas by merging Nabucco with South Stream, which would weaken the original purpose of diversification by Nabucco. Like the Nord Stream pipeline, which carries Russian gas to Germany via the Baltic Sea, South Stream also negatively affects the EU's foreign energy policy efforts.


Competition from EU projects for Russian pipelines could limit the importance of the Caspian region to EU energy security. However, there is a risk of losing the race for delivery contracts with the Caspian Sea countries, which are in dialogue with Russia and the Asian powers. The conflict over the distribution of the Caspian Sea bed may also make it difficult to transport gas to Europe. Iran, with its vast gas reserves, could indeed become an important energy partner for the European Union. However, the implementation of this option depends to a large extent on how the nuclear crisis develops and on US-Iranian relations.

This is why the EU must force diversification out of the Caspian region into the Middle East and Africa, which are potentially the largest growth market for gas exports. Through the European Neighborhood Policy, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the strategic partnership with Africa, and its relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council. The European Union has bilateral and multilateral frameworks conducive to expressing more and more in these regions also its intentions with regard to foreign energy policy.

5- Russia also needs energy security.

Talk of a European-Russian mutual dependence haunts both sides, and with the European Union adopting the “Energy Union” strategy (Fischer-Herzog, 2016) in 2014, it was necessary to ask: How can the contradictions be resolved between the energy strategy that aims only to reduce “Russian dependence” and the strategy of Competition in the single market? There is an urgent need to re-establish dialogue with Russia and reinvigorate the mutual long-term vision being embraced. The European Union is no more dependent on Russia for gas supplies than Russia is on the European Union for its exports. In fact, Gazprom exports 70% of its natural gas production and the EU buys 186 billion cubic meters of it annually.

Figure 3: Differences in filling rates of warehouses under the control of Gazprom and other warehouses.



Source: JRC calculations, based on Gaz Storage Europe AGSI+ data.

Beyond dependencies, shouldn't we talk about interdependence and seek a common framework for new business relationships in cooperation? According to Dmitry Semenov, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, the country has viewed the Union's energy security strategy as a threat to its interests. Russia also needs energy security and it is developing an offensive diversification policy, which EU countries also consider "aggressive". How,

then, can we rethink interdependent relationships? This question arises for all producing, distributing, and consuming countries: Turkey, a pivotal transit country, must coordinate its strategies with each other to promote this economic activity and maintain its diplomatic position. Supply routes from Russia and the Middle East make it a key potential ally, but gas pipelines supplying Europe such as Tanap, supplied by Azerbaijan, or TAP, which would connect Greece and the Balkans, are of very low capacity. Should not we build a stronger energy hub cooperation in Turkey? For the whole region and for Europe - which will also have to develop its own regional hubs such as **BEMIP**.[†] (Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Scheme).

II- Energy security needs and coordination of transformation strategies:

Energy has always been among the most important geopolitical challenges and given the high prices and the obstacles of gas supply chains resulting from the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, the issue has become an urgent priority as the European Union is committed to addressing short-term pressures while striving to respect the long-term goals towards carbon neutrality. The Energy Council of the European Union /The United States of America is working in Washington to stimulate cooperation in this regard.

1- Energy prices and inflation.

The global demand system resulted in the ignition of energy prices in the context of an increase in demand and a decline in supply. As for natural gas, prices have doubled from six (06) to ten (10) times over what they were a year ago (Borell, 2022). This exerted a strong pressure on electricity prices (a commodity alternative) due to the way it is priced in the European wholesale market, which triggered inflation at the end of 2021 due to the Covid-19 pandemic; Currently, in conjunction with the Russian crisis, it is no longer just a price issue, but a security issue. Energy policy occupies an

[†] BEMIP: Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan.

important place in Russian-European relations: more than 40% of European gas imports come from Russia, which makes more than 60% of Russian energy revenues from European sources. Within this context, EU officials believe that reducing the total share of Russian gas imports makes them invest not only in the green transition, but even in the decline of their strategic dependency. Similar to Russia, which took measures to support its resistance to UN economic sanctions by increasing its hard currency reserves, Europe must take measures to counter supply disruption through: (Borell J., 2022) As an urgent priority, strategic reserves must be formed and the possibility of joint purchase of gas should be considered, according to what the European Commission proposed in a think tank report to ensure security for all at a manageable price (Gros, 2022). Russia has already used energy supplies for political purposes. This time, despite fully fulfilling its obligations, Gazprom, the state corporation, refused to raise supplies to fill the capacities of European warehouses, which increased tension in the market.

2- What can the Euro-American Energy Council do?

To address the troubles in the short term while meeting the imperative of achieving climate neutrality and reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and in cooperation with the United States and other partners, we work against the use of energy supplies as a weapon and as a lever for geopolitical influence; The EU-US Joint Statement (U.S. Department of state, 2023) places resilience to future price shocks and safeguards against geopolitical tensions at the core of transatlantic energy security policy, stating: "We are determined to ensure the energy security of the European Union and our neighbors, including Moldova, Ukraine and the Western Balkan countries." } The strategic starting point is the European Green Deal and the energy transition, which must be accelerated in light of the climate emergency. The path of this transition has its drawbacks, but the current events should not be allowed to distance us from this strategic path. } In the short term, the immediate problem facing Europe is related to the

security of gas supplies and must be addressed. This requires diversifying import methods and sources. The United States is the largest supplier of liquefied natural gas to Europe, and work is being done together to intensify cooperation to ensure securing gas supplies for the coming months, as well as negotiations with Norway, Qatar, Azerbaijan, Algeria and others to increase the supply of liquefied natural gas. These efforts can be successful if we invest in relationships with potential LNG suppliers, not as a short-term solution, but as part of an interest in developing more strategic relationships, also working on renewable energies such as solar and hydrogen.) It was finally found that only a decarbonized energy system can lead to reliable, affordable and safe energy. This is why we must cooperate closely with the United States in the field of technology. Energy efficiency, renewable energies (such as wind power), and hydrogen are among the shared priorities globally.) The energy transition continues to alter geopolitical balances, with the center of power shifting from those who control fossil fuels to those who develop clean energy technologies. This will require countries that now rely heavily on fossil fuel exports to diversify their economies. (Borell f.t., 2021) Transitioning to carbon neutrality and a just energy transition, is essential to saving our planet. A clean-energy world is more stable and better for all, though it will also create new material dependencies.

III- Discussion opportunities and threats to Algeria's share in the European energy market changes.

Algeria has always been an important partner of the European Union in many areas, as it is a major and reliable supplier of natural gas, which has guaranteed between 10 and 12% of total European imports over the past ten years. This makes it an important partner for the European Union, especially in the current geopolitical context. Algeria, with proven reserves of natural gas amounting to approximately 2.4 trillion cubic meters, supplied about 11% of the gas consumed in Europe before the war in Ukraine, compared to 47% for Russia. It is the first African exporter of natural gas and the seventh in the world (Butt, 2023). Despite the existence of a partnership

agreement since 2002, Algeria took protectionist measures in 2015 in the eyes of the Europeans, which had a negative impact on exchanges. As fossil fuel prices fell then, Algeria worked to reduce its imports, causing EU exports to decline by 45% since then. With the visit of the President of the European Council (Charles Michel) in September 2022, a more positive dynamic has been set in motion. However, the change of Spain's position on the issue of Western Sahara led to the weakening of this dynamic. Imports from Spain would be de facto suspended almost completely, which would weigh heavily on the relationship between the EU and Algeria.

1- The European Union's cards on its negotiating table with Algeria.

The European Union really wants to develop its relations with Algeria in the economic field, not only as a gas supplier, but as a preparation for the future, according to what the prospective studies showed (Borell F.T., 2021) and in service of the policies pursued, by sponsoring investments in the renewable energy sector in particular, as Algeria has enormous potential in this field which is still underutilized today. European technical expertise can help Algeria diversify its economy and increase its non-energy exports to the EU. As for migration, the union is seeking cooperation regarding border management and voluntary return from Algeria to sub-Saharan Africa. In exchange for judicial and police cooperation, he accelerated the ongoing negotiations to reach an agreement with Eurojust and a "working arrangement" with Europol, hinting at the ability to help Algeria recover the money of "illicit gains", within the framework of the country's ongoing measures to combat corruption. Regarding the global geopolitical situation, it is not surprising that there are differences of opinion on the issue of Russian intervention in Ukraine and its repercussions, as the Union does not consider it an internal European matter only. Rather, a war is taking place on European soil, but it poses a great challenge to the whole world, as it constitutes an attack on the very foundations of international law. It calls on its partners to join efforts at the international level for the withdrawal of

Russian forces. As for Algeria, it is believed that it is a voice that has a great influence in what some call the “Global South” (Anne, 2003). In Mali and the neighboring Sahel region, Algeria plays an important role: it is the guarantor of the 2015 Algiers Agreement and the leader of international mediation that also includes the European Union and neighboring countries. Today, however, this agreement is facing difficulty due to the renewed tension between Bamako and the northern movements. Concern about the development of terrorism in the Sahel region and the Gulf of Guinea and the growing involvement of Russian Wagner militias in the region. It is necessary to re-launch the high-level dialogue between the European Union and Algeria on security.

2- Algeria's cards on the negotiating table with the European Union.

When TSGP was launched in 2009, its investment cost was estimated at \$10 billion (€7 billion). This gas pipeline is 4,128 kilometers long, including 1,037 kilometers in Nigerian territory, 841 kilometers in Niger and 2,310 kilometers in Algeria, and this gas pipeline will also supply the Sahel countries. Precisely in 2016, following the outbreak of the Sonatrach 4 case, King Mohammed VI announced, during an official visit to Nigeria, with President Muhammadu Buhari, the launch of the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline (NMGP), estimated at 5,660 km in length, a large part of which is at sea., estimated to cost \$25 billion, is more expensive, longer and more complex than its competitor TSGP. On July 28, 2023, the Algerian Minister of Energy and Mines, Mohamed Arkab, and his counterparts from Nigeria, Tempere Silva and Niger, Mahamane Sani Mohamedou, signed a Memorandum of Understanding, in Algiers. To formalize the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline Project (TSGP). Which will allow the transfer of billions of cubic meters of Nigerian gas to Algeria via Niger. Algeria will then be able to send Nigerian gas to European Union countries through Transmed, which connects the country with Italy via Tunisia. In a strong signal internationally within a special geopolitical context, (Marks, 2022) “is characterized by strong demand for hydrocarbons, especially natural gas,

and a lack of supply due to the lack of gas investments that has been observed since 2014. TSGP requires tripartite funding proportional to the length of the route in each country. Niger is not in a position to finance such a project, although it considers it a priority for its development. Algeria, which is supposed to finance most of it, was not prepared to do so during the years of the pandemic and is now in a better position.

More than 60% of the gas consumed in Spain comes from Algeria. Algerian gas will be delivered to Spain exclusively via the Medgaz offshore gas pipeline launched in 2011. Via the Mediterranean. Algeria is ready for the immediate delivery of gas shipments that Europe needs for the industrial sector or for the family sector via the MEDGAZ pipeline. In light of the reshaping of gas geopolitics resulting from the war in Ukraine, especially after the closure of the European-Maghreb gas pipeline (GME), Algeria ended up imposing its image as a reliable partner (Kadry, 2023).

Conclusion:

Given the data of the geopolitical situation, we believe that the European-Algerian relations stand at a critical crossroads, given the liberal orientations of Europe and its transatlantic alliances on the one hand, and Algeria's strategic choices since the Non-Aligned Movement, and the outcomes of its economic transformation process, such as its quest to join the BRICS group of emerging countries on the other hand. However, the commercial logic requires the two parties to think pragmatically to benefit from the geographical proximity. Europe, in light of its management of the Ukraine crisis and dealing with its repercussions in the short and long term, cannot ignore it as the third global consumer of energy, a nearby source that produces and transmits fossil energies, ready infrastructure and linked to it by a partnership agreement. It has huge potential in the field of renewable energies, which are being researched in order to increase its effectiveness and sustainability. Our analysis through this paper has reached the following results: - Clarity of positions in the diplomacy of war, the European Union was forced to get rid of its energetic dependence

on Russia, which has been threatening to cut off supplies of geostrategic expansion. - The energy policy of the European Union inspires from the goals of the European Steel and Coal Community (CECA), and remembers that energy was and still is the most important lever for sovereignty. The war in Ukraine prompted politicians in Europe to review the objectives of the Green Deal for Europe and the 20/20/20 strategy, REpowerEU and Euratom, by raising the ceiling of carbon aspirations to 40% of the energy mix within the limits of 2030.

- Absence from the peaceful use of nuclear energy for ecological purposes, which was stopped by the unplanned war. France still produces 70% of its electricity from nuclear energy sources, Belgium 50%, Germany decided to get out of this source and then had to extend the use of its last three stations. The alliance with the United States of America led to the declaration of the Joint Energy Council on transatlantic coordination on energy to contribute to the stability and transparency of global energy markets by promoting energy diversification and security, supporting energy efficiency measures, and developing technologies that contribute to the transition towards net zero emissions by 2050, and through Research, innovation, compatible policies, and commercial cooperation. Considering that accelerating the energy transition, reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and reducing energy consumption is the key to enhancing energy security and confronting attempts to use energy as a weapon. Three cold seasons out of four in the old continent made the issue of gas causes headaches for officials there. Strategically, it is necessary to fill the stores and diversify the sources of supplies, and they are two keys in the hands of Algeria, in terms of the abundance of natural resources, geographical proximity, the readiness of the infrastructure of the supply networks and its security. - The competitors for the market share of the producers (Nigeria and Qatar) are limited by the geographical proximity to Algeria, the only competitor of the carriers (Morocco) is not ready in the network and is still begging for the support of its political allies, far from the commercial logic; In a diplomatic alienation from outside the African Union, Morocco flirts with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Bibliography List:

Le pacte vert pour l'Europe. (2019, 12 le 11). *Le pacte vert pour l'Europe*. Bruxelles,, COMMISSION EUROPÉENNE, l'Union européenne (UE).

Anne, J. (2003). *The Foreign Policies of the Global South: Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks*. colorado (USA): Lynne Rienner Publishers.

borell, f. t. (2021, avril 26). The Geopolitics of Climate Change. *project syndicate*, p. 09.

borell, j. (2022). securite energetique de l'europe et cooperation UE-Etas-Unis. *le service diplomatique de l'Union Europeenne* (p. 02). washington: EEAS.

butt, h. (2023, 01 31). *S&p global commodity insights*. Récupéré sur S&p global commodity insights:
<https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/013123-algerian-gas-flows-to-europe-shrink-but-italy-gains-as-trade-ties-strengthen>

Fischer-Herzog, C. (2016, 4). L'Union de l'énergie :quelle sécurité énergétique en Europe ? (IRIS, Éd.) *revue-internationale-et-strategique*, 101-111.

Gros, D. (2022, janvier). A (E)U-TURN FROM NORD STREAM 2 TOWARDS A EUROPEAN STRATEGIC GAS RESERVE. (CEPS, Éd.) *CEPS Policy Brief*(02-2022), 1-8.

HERZOG, C. F. (2016, 4). L'Union de l'énergie : quelle sécurité énergétique en europe? (I. éditions, Éd.) *Revue internationale et stratégique*, 4(104), 101 à 111.

<https://www.dila.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/>. (2021, 10 27). *vie publique*. Récupéré sur <https://www.dila.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/>:
<https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d&q=Faire+face+%C3%A0+la+hausse+du+prix+de+l%27%C3%A9nergie+%3A+la+bo%C3%A9te+%C3%A0+outils+de+la+Commission+europ%C3%A9enne>

Marks, J. (2022, juin). Nigeria renews commitment to Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline. *african energy* (463), 5.

Möckli, D. (2008). *La sécurité énergétique en Europe: état et perspectives*. Zurich: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich.

Studies, (.). (2008). *La sécurité énergétique en europe etat et perspectives*. zurich: ETH.

Tavernier, j.-l. (2022). *depenses de consommation des menages en biens*. Montrouge sedex: Insee.

Tavernier, j.-l. (2023). *depenses de consommation des menages en biens*. Montrouge sedex: Insee.

U.S.Department of state. (2023, april 4). بيان مشترك بشأن مجلس الطاقة بين الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الأوروبي. Récupéré sur An official website of the United States Government: <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-eu-energy-council-2/>