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Conflict, peace and security in Africa: an evaluation of after 50 years of independence

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Abstract:

In this study, the main aim is to clarify the role of African peace and security council role in resolving conflicts and wars between African countries after their independence .In addition to this, since the independence processes in the African continent, armed conflicts, peace and security have raised concern and attention both at the domestic level and at the international scale. In recent years, all aspects have undergone significant changes which have given rise to intense debate.

The end of some historical conflicts has taken place in a context of slight decrease in the number of armed conflicts and the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. Moreover, African regional organizations have staged an increasingly more active internal shift in matters related to peace and security, encouraged by the idea of promoting “African solutions to African problems”.

Keywords:

Africa;Peace;Security;Conflicts;African Union

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1. Introduction

To be valid, issues related to conflicts, peace and security in Africa have generated such a constant international debate in recent decades that other important political, economic or social aspects also taking place in the continent since its independent processes have been marginalized and obscured. Additionally, in the past two decades, however, this rhetoric, sometimes monolithic and reductionist, has been challenged by wider-range visions, which have incorporated other factors and dimensions to their analysis. This analysis, to which many African voices (universities, research centers, etc.) have contributed, is characterized by at least two elements. First, we believe that the evolution of postcolonial Africa must be contextualized within a historical and international context. In addition to this, the African political, social, economic and cultural processes should be interpreted based in the European legacy, the following cold war context, the security and development instruments and proposals submitted by the West and, finally, the current context of globalization. To be clear, the following pages, structured in three different sections, are intended to contribute, with some facts and reflections and in a very descriptive way, to the purpose of assessing peace and security in Africa. In the first, we analyze the evolution of conflicts, peace processes and governance based on the different indicators and analysis carried out by specialized centres in recent years. The second part examines the emergence in the last decade of what has become known as "African peace and security architecture" (APSA) and the interventionist shift undertaken by institutions and African governments since then. We examine also their achievements and limitations, some of their dilemmas (such as the famous and controversial R2P principle, the "Responsibility to Protect") and their relationship with institutions like the European Union.

Research Problematic:

This study, also will center on the changes that have known the African Union, and how it will affect the study of this latter in the future. For doing so, we have opted to ask the following problematic:

What are the main difficulties in African countries after its independences?

1. Armed conflicts, peace processes and governance in Africa

The following section discusses three important issues related to peace and security in Africa: a) the evolution of the number of major armed conflicts in Africa, which reveal a sharp decline in recent years, as well as tension and political instability situations; b) the existence of numerous peace and negotiation processes and significant local experiences in management and conflict resolution; and c) the evolution of the continent in terms of governance and democratization.

1-1- Major armed conflicts

To start with, armed conflict has been a recurring reality in the analysis of postcolonial Africa. According to Lindemann (2008), since the 60s, a total of 24 sub-Saharan African countries (i.e., almost 50% of African states) have suffered war, while 22 other countries have managed to “avoid it”. “Freedom wars”, “intractable wars”, “proxy wars” (substitute wars or wars controlled from abroad, typical conflicts of the context of bipolar dispute) or “post-Cold War conflicts” have sparked a major review of its causes and consequences, sometimes very biased and reductionist, based on very different sources, methodologies and data. Nevertheless, most sources agree that Africa has experienced a substantial decline in the number of “major armed conflicts” in recent years.¹ For example, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) states that if in 1990 there were 11 “major armed conflicts” in Africa, this figure had dropped to just one in 2007 (Somalia). In total, this agency estimates that since the end of the Cold War a total of 14 armed conflicts can be counted in Africa, namely: Algeria, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), Republic of the Congo, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda². Some of these contexts, according to the cyclical dynamic of violence that often characterizes many armed conflicts, are still undergoing noteworthy episodes of violence, for example, the events of the last months of 2008 in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, or the serious situation in the Sudanese region of Darfur. Other conflicts appear to be nearing their closing stages, as is the case of Uganda, while the events taking place in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria also deserve special attention due to the periodic high levels of violence, destruction and fatalities reached. Although we are aware that by referring only to the major armed conflicts we have left out other conflict situations on the continent, the fact is that this approach enables us to focus on the common characteristics of these conflicts.³

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Although the vast majority are regarded as intrastate conflict type (except the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia between 1998 and 2000), they are also highly regionalised conflicts. Similarly, they are conflicts occurring in contexts more and more internationalized and transnationalized. At different levels, not only at direct contenders level, a large number of actors are involved either in their management and / or resolution (UN, NGOs, etc.), either in their dynamics (third countries, private security companies, natural resource companies, etc.), creating complex networks linking local armed factions with actors of very different nature.⁴

From this, it follows that the war in Africa has had an extremely significant humanitarian and socio-economic impact. The estimations only in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are that over five million people may have died as a direct or indirect result of armed violence. In countries like Sierra Leone, almost half the population (about two million) were displaced due to armed clashes, while in Darfur the death toll since 2003 has been estimated in more than 300,000 people. Moreover, a recent report by IANSA, Oxfam International and Saferworld (2007) states that the continent has lost more than 300,000 million dollars as a result of wars in recent years. Above all, in that respect, in recent years, coups d'état (of varying intensity and consequence) have been staged in Chad, Central African Republic, Guinea-Conakry, Mauritania and Madagascar raising uncertain scenarios. There are also tensions linked to contexts of post-peace agreement, such as Burundi, Ivory Coast and Guinea-Bissau. On the other hand, countries like Kenya and Zimbabwe have been subjected to strong internal political disputes, sparking intense diplomatic activity on an international scale. Finally, we must also point out some territorial tensions which have given rise to confrontations, for example, between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula, or between Chad and Sudan over the situation in Darfur.⁵ Furthermore, other tensions (at times with heavy military activity) were linked to secessionist ambitions (such as the Casamance region in Senegal or Cabinda in Angola). The narratives seeking to explain all these conflicts have often insisted on linking violence with issues such as identity (ethnic, religious, cultural), the scarcity or the abundance of natural resources, the extreme fragility and sometimes the collapse of the African postcolonial state, or the prevailing economic underdevelopment in many of these contexts. Without underestimating the explanatory power of each of these elements, many authors have challenged the mono-causal views and stressed the importance of developing complex analysis interrelating endogenous and exogenous factors of various kinds.⁶

Approximately, a more complex analysis of armed conflicts has advocated increasing the visibility of peace and negotiation processes, often neglected and ignored.

1.2- Peace processes and conflict resolution

Moreover, many of the initiatives or processes having received attention of some kind have usually been those led by international actors such the United Nations, to the detriment of organizations led by local actors such as civil society organizations, women organizations or the increasing importance in some countries of certain regional organizations.⁷ In addition to this, the Yearbook on peace processes, prepared by the Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace) of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, for example, estimates that in 2009 there were a total of 17 peace processes or negotiations going on in Africa: Mali (with several Tuareg factions), Niger (the MNJ), Nigeria (the Niger Delta region), Eritrea-Ethiopia, Ethiopia (in the Ogaden and Oromia regions), Somalia, Darfur (Sudan), Burundi (with the FNL), Chad, Central African Republic, eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda (with the LRA) and the Western Sahara region. Also, the last decade has witnessed the end of historical conflicts such as South Sudan, Sierra Leone and Liberia, thanks to the participation 13 of both international diplomacy as well as local and regional actors of a social and political character. Thus, in the case of southern Sudan, for example, the diplomatic efforts of countries like Norway or the U.S., the role played by the regional organization IGAD, the political will of certain sectors of the parties in conflict (the Government of Sudan and the SPLA, led at the time by John Garang) or the crucial role played by some actors of civil society were decisive factors in the historic peace agreement signed in January 2005 which put an end to nearly three decades of armed conflict, after having caused two million fatal casualties and the same amount of persons displaced by violence.⁸ Another remarkable case is that of Sierra Leone, West Africa. In recent years, this conflict, which left a high death toll and a great number of displaced people, has managed to hold presidential, parliamentary and local elections and to normalize the internal operations of its institutions after decades of significant episodes of instability. The role played by some civil society organizations or certain groups such as women, journalists or interfaith groups in some phases of the conflict has been highlighted as one of the factors which made possible the end of armed violence. Also, the role played by ECOWAS, an organization of West African countries, was also crucial in stabilizing the country

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and in bringing the hostilities to an end.⁹ Finally, the literature analyzing the case of Somalia has also repeatedly emphasized the crucial role played by women's organizations or by the clans of elders in the various negotiation processes. Prior to that, along the active role of certain local actors in the negotiating process, the importance of the indigenous initiatives for conflict resolution, reconciliation and peace building in many of these contexts has also been stressed. Far from providing a romantic vision and, therefore, highlighting its limitations and contradictions, Tim Murithi has analyzed the endogenous mechanisms for conflict resolution in contexts such as Nigeria (Tiv community), the Guurti system used to achieve stability in Somaliland (northern Somalia), the Mato Oput peacebuilding process between the community Acholi in northern Uganda, or the implementation of the Ubuntu concept in the reconciliation process in South Africa. For Murithi, the importance of these initiatives, as opposed sometimes to the exogenous mechanisms not rooted in the local world view, lies in their internal legitimacy, their inclusiveness and their ability to reach a consensus¹⁰.

Besides, this issue has led to debates on reconciliation processes in countries like South Africa, Rwanda or Sierra Leone, where transitional justice measures of different kind have been put in place. While South Africa and Rwanda represent examples of a more restorative type of justice (with the experiences of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation or the implementation of the gacaca courts, respectively), the Special Court for Sierra Leone has opted, more controversially, for a punitive action, not so rooted in the local worldview and, according to the most critical voices, unhelpful and even harmful to the process of reconciliation and peace-building.¹¹

1.3- Governance and democratization

Nevertheless, most of the "international indices and indicators on governance" would place many of the African states to the tail end of performance in this regard.¹² However, the global data behind such indicators hides substantial differences in the different contexts and situations. Thus, according to the "Ibrahim Index for African Governance", countries like Mauritius, Seychelles, Cape Verde, Botswana and South Africa seem to show a very positive evolution in governance, closely followed by Namibia, Ghana, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe and Senegal. On the other hand, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Angola, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Eritrea, Guinea-Conakry and Nigeria are the countries, according to that index, showing the poorest indicators.¹³

On the one hand, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an instrument through which countries voluntarily undergo a process of self-assessment divided into several phases and structured around four main axes: i) democracy and political governance; ii) economic governance and management, iii) corporate governance, and iv) socio-economic development. 29 of the 53 African states have joined. Also, the APRM has begun to operate and 13 countries so far have been evaluated: Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, Algeria, South Africa, Benin, Uganda, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali and Mozambique, and more recently, Lesotho and Mauritius. This initiative is part of the process of the so-called New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

While this initiative has sparked a major international attention, it has also been criticized for the lack of involvement of some African leaders in the whole process¹⁴.

In short, the evolution of armed conflicts, peace and negotiation processes, or the level of governance and democratization in Africa in recent decades has not been necessarily negative. Against the Afro-pessimistic rhetoric, other rhetorics have sought, on one hand, to use more complex and contextual analysis and, on the other, to increase the visibility of other positive realities in which logically the local initiatives are highlighted. In terms of governance, the key questions revolve around the actual contribution of the electoral processes to the stabilization and following democratization in some contexts, the impact of instruments like the APRM and the African Charter on the consolidation of certain processes, or the type of participation and coordination of the African and international political and social actors initiatives of this kind.¹⁵

2. The emergence of an “ African peace and security Architecture” APSA

The events of the last decade have been a turning point in terms of peace and security as far as Africa is concerned. The next section will discuss: a) the rhetoric, actions and institutions appeared in the recent years and shaping what is known as “African peace and security architecture” (APSA); b) the historical and controversial debate on the principle of sovereignty and the right to interfere in Africa, currently organized around the notion of “Responsibility to Protect” and included in the AU Charter; and c) the European Union's role in the whole process of preparing and developing the APSA.

2.1 THE “AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE” (APSA)

In the past few years, this attitude has been reflected by the presence of the AU and some African regional organizations in a number of “peacekeeping” operations in the continent. The pioneering operations of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early 90s have been joined by other agencies such as the Community of Central African States (ECCAS) who sent the MICOPAX (the former FOMUC) to the Central African Republic, or ECOWAS to Ivory Coast. As the AU, it is worth noting the missions to Burundi (AMIB), Comoros (MIOC), Somalia (AMISOM) and Darfur (UNAMID), the latter in coordination with the United Nations.¹⁶ Equally important, APSA accounts for the different elements implemented (or currently developing) by the AU and other regional agencies to consolidate peacekeeping and security efforts in the continent. The structure includes: a policy-making body (the Peace and Security Council, PCS); a centre for analysis and data collection (the Continental Early Warning System, CEWS); two military structures (the African Standby Force, ASF, and the Military Staff Committee, MSC); an advisory body of outside mediation (the Panel of the Wise); and a special fund to finance the operations (the Peace Fund).¹⁷

Moreover, the Council consists of 15 members, five of them elected for three year terms. Some of its main objectives are: i) promoting peace, security and stability in Africa; ii) the prevention of conflicts; iii) promoting the activities of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; iv) the coordination of efforts to fight terrorism; v) the development of a common defence policy for the AU, and vi) the strengthening of democratic practices, good governance, human rights or fundamental freedoms protection.¹⁸

Coupled with, the EU has been particularly active in supporting all of this architecture. In this regard, it is worth noting the instrument known as African Peace Facility (APF), created in 2003 by the EU for the financing of peacekeeping operations in Africa. To that effect, it has received an initial allocation of 250 million Euros (mostly for AMIS), an amount which, in its second phase (2008-2010), has been increased to 300 million. The funds are directly managed by African personnel, in line with its three fundamental principles: i) “ownership”; ii) promotion of African solidarity; and iii) creating the conditions for development. Also, the EU has also kept the Instrument for Stability (IfS), intended primarily for mediation efforts and the strengthening of the regional capacities for peacekeeping. The IfS includes a crisis response component (100 million Euros) and a component of long-term

response (40 million) planned to fight the existence of regional threats. On the other hand, the EU has contributed logistical support through the mechanisms of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The civil-military operation in support of AMIS II in Darfur in 2005 reflected this policy.¹⁹

Finally, it is true that EU member states have been more reluctant than before to send troops as part of UN missions, especially taking into account the experiences of the first half of the 90s in Somalia or Rwanda. Nevertheless, the development of military missions led by the EU suggests that this body will continue to have a specific weight in these matters. In this regard, four of the 16 operational missions in Africa are coordinated by the EU: The EU SSR in Guinea-Bissau, the EUPOL and EUSEC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the EUFOR Chad / RCA, which in 2008 handed over the control of its operations to the United Nations (MINURCAT II) and whose strength (about 3,000 personnel) has been incorporated into the new mission.²⁰

2- The debate on the Responsibility to Protect in Africa

Finally, for the civil society and individuals, it means the responsibility to put some pressure on the decision makers to decide what should be done, by whom and when. The R2P is framed within the controversial debate about the events in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo during the 90s, a debated which opposed those in favor of establishing a “right to humanitarian intervention” and those arguing in defence of the principle of sovereignty recognized by the UN Charter. In this regard, R2P stands as a concept seeking to give an answer to this debate. R2P’s origins date back to the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, which became the major issue in the recommendations of the High-Level Panel of the United Nations, A More Secure World in 2004, and in the report of UN Secretary General, In Larger Freedom, a year later.²¹

Along with at the UN World Summit in September 2005, the heads of state, unanimously, accepted the concept, also acknowledged by the UN Security Council as a general principle. In February 2008, United Nations appointed a Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, with the primary mandate to develop and reach a consensus on the concept. A final document which has contributed to this process is the January 2009 report of UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, Implementing the responsibility to Protect, which delves into some of the elements in this regard.

Additionally, the 2001 report, The Responsibility to Protect establishes a set of principles and core elements. Firstly, it believes that “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect”. Second, the foundations of R2P rely on: the obligations inherent to the concept of sovereignty; the responsibility of the Security Council, for the maintenance of international peace and security; the specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law; and the developing practice of states, regional organizations and the Security Council itself. Third, the responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities: i) the responsibility to prevent; ii) the responsibility to react; and iii) the responsibility to rebuild. Fourth, the R2P establishes prevention as a priority. Finally, the R2P establishes a series of principles in the exceptional case of a military intervention, the last option in certain situations (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing).²² The AU Charter implicitly includes R2P’s concept and rhetoric. In this regard, the Peace and Security Council can assess potential crisis situations, send reconnaissance missions and legitimize the AU’s intervention in internal crisis situations.

Furthermore, Article 4 states “the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security”. In particular, Article 7 of the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union states that the Council may “recommend to the Assembly, pursuant to Article 4 of the Constitutive Act, intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments”. Indeed, a substantive difference between the Protocol of the AU and the OAU Charter. With the adoption of these legal measures, for the first time in the history of Africa, the continental organization has the authority to intervene in domestic affairs in any situation where atrocities against minority groups or communities at risk may appear to be committed.²³

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In the same way, the establishment of the ASF for 2010 should be framed within that final purpose. AU's deployment of the missions in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia is, somehow, a first attempt to operationalize R2P. Some even believe that the hybrid model proposed in Darfur with the UNAMID (AU-UN) defines the horizon of that implementation, which would combine foreign and local participation. However, the implementation of this principle in the African continent has given rise to many problems. To the logistic and institutional limitations mentioned above implied by, for example, carrying out operations in a context of the extent of Darfur, we must add the controversy surrounding a still emerging debate which has raised a large controversy. Indeed, for some, the possible failure in Darfur lies, among other issues, in the inadequate conceptualization of R2P, in the expectations born out of the idea that physical protection is, in fact, possible within the limits of a military force, or in the confusing advocacy of this principle.²⁴

2-3 The APSA and the European Union (EU)

In fact, the Lisbon Summit of December 2007 marked a turning point in the relations between the EU and the African continent, when an agreement was reached on what is known as "Africa-EU Joint Strategy". This document represents a de facto global roadmap for the relations between the two organizations in the coming years. The Action Plan of the Strategy for 2008-2010 identifies several strategic priorities in the areas of peace and security, democratic governance, human rights, trade and regional integration among others. Both parties have agreed to implement these priority actions in the context of specific "Partnerships". Each of these eight partnerships is open to the participation of a wide range of stakeholders, ranging from the EU and AU Commissions or the Councils of Ministers of both bodies to Member States, decentralized agencies and civil society organizations, among many others.²⁵ More precisely, the main purpose of the "Partnership for Peace and Security" is to strengthen the mechanisms that should allow both organizations the opportunity to "respond timely and adequately to security threats, and also to join efforts in addressing global challenges". To achieve these objectives, the paper argues, among other measures, for the strengthening of dialogue at political and technical level (in particular, between the PSC of the AU and the Political and Security Committee of the EU), giving support to the instruction and training of the African military, or the creation of sustainable financing mechanisms. The launch of this partnership also includes the creation of joint working groups between the AU and the EU, as well as with other organizations such as the UN and NATO.²⁶

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However, after the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty some questions have emerged as to whether other priorities might affect the practical implementation of “Partnership for Peace and Security”. It is widely believed that although the EU has strengthened its support to peace and security issues in Africa, it should commit itself to a longer term and take concrete steps to do so, for example, the appointment of a EU representative in the headquarters of the AU, Addis Ababa.

In short, in the last decade the notion of “African solutions to African problems” has influenced the emergence and gradual consolidation of an African architecture of peace and security a priori more interventionist but also facing major problems and arousing fundamental debates. Political, logistical or operational constraints or the coordination and complementarity problems between African governments and regional or international agencies show some of the difficulties that APSA could face in the coming years.²⁷

3- Concerns for the future: new security challenges

On the other hand, the concern about some issues stemming from the so-called new agenda, or more properly, from the increasing and explicit convergence of security views and commitments national and international, development (including democratization and governance) and peace.

3-1. The context: convergence of development and security

It should be remembered, contextually, that the post-Cold War has changed many things, particularly regarding the relationship between security, peace and development. To put it succinctly, the bipolar world did establish a clear separation between security policies and development policies, although both were included, with different emphasis, in the United Nations Charter. In parallel, albeit separately, two political and institutional architectures were designed, one for managing the socio-economic development issues of the states, and the other, for peace and security, a situation which prevailed after the widespread African independences in the early 60s.

The idea of development was associated exclusively to the economic development of the states. Poverty, social exclusion, hunger, respect for civil and political rights were domestic issues that states had to face by themselves with the only help of other countries cooperation for the development, the multilateral agencies and, in extreme cases, of humanitarian aid. The promotion of economic welfare and the task of ensuring the basic needs of the populations fell to the sovereign states, which could seek outside support from the Bretton Woods

institutions, multilateral and bilateral donor agencies and from UN specialized agencies.²⁸ Security issues, meanwhile, had a very limited agenda, focusing on the protection of territorial integrity, the defence of sovereignty and the promotion of the states' national interests, always in the context of the bipolar rivalry between East and West, and often under the even more restrictive and exclusively military prism of the national security paradigm.²⁹

Moreover, the relationship between security and development, in the post-Cold War and the “new” violent armed conflicts context, will redefine itself in this context, a process which will culminate with the emergence of the concept of “peace-building” understood as a comprehensive framework for the peace, security and development agendas.³⁰

A turning point, with great impact on the reformulation of the security-development nexus, occurs precisely after the September 11 attacks and the “global war on terror.” The immediate result: development, aid and cooperation policies are contingent on an increasingly narrow security agenda led by anti-terrorist objectives.³¹ In this context, to which other threats such as drug trafficking will be added, the priority will be given to political stability objectives, to the geographic and thematic reallocation of aid flows, and to the great debates about human security, complex humanitarian emergencies, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building, to the responsibility to protect or to the potentially threatening role of “fragile states”.

3-2 Convergence of agendas, human security, securitization and new threats in Africa

We will limit it to two examples: a) “Securitization” and militarization of development: the omnipresence of security sector reform and the emergence of initiatives such as Africom In recent years and in the context of “consolidation of peace” (peace-building in the restricted sense of United Nations), of political crisis outcomes and agreements to end armed violence, one of the constants has been the commitment to reform the security sector.

In this context, the debate on the new conceptualization of threats has also reappeared, and specifically, the initiative of creating a “think tank” of social scientists in support of the new military operational command of the United States for Africa, AFRICOM, created by the Bush administration to prevent the blurring between the European Command, the Central Command and the Pacific Command of the decisions on the African continent.³²

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The least worrisome is the idea itself, on the other hand, not a novelty: it is reminiscent of the Camelot project, where the U.S. Armed Forces, in the 60s, would fund the social sciences regarding the case of Latin 31 America. The project gave rise to a huge debate after Johan Galtung denounced it publicly, although in that case there was no public and transparent announcement. What is relevant and pertinent, as noted by Edward Newman (2009), is that it shows a new strategy and a “focusing” on Africa in the U.S. thinking in the context of securitization after September 11.³³

In the same way, the relationship between security, development and governance, in terms of construction of threats via securitization, is what gives meaning to what is only a reorganization of military structures: the proposal to create a unit of social scientists to back up and support the information for AFRICOM's decision taking shows that the alarmist agenda of securitizing the issue of governance and fragile states, driven by some hegemonic states, has made some headway.³⁴ That is to say that, the risk of the creation of “evil states” to use Jenny Pearce's terminology situations, where the state acts “to reproduce and transmit violences through socialization spaces rather than legitimately monopolize violence or create the conditions for society to live without violence”. Finally, the United Nations fears that the impact of this situation could reverse the remarkable gains achieved in recent years in countries like Sierra Leone in peace-building and encourage a new cycle of violence and destabilization.³⁵

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

What are the factors which have relegated civil society organizations or community-type and local initiatives to a secondary role? How can the APSA include these initiatives in its agenda? Fifth, the EU and other international organizations such as United Nations have strengthened their cooperation with APSA in this type of contexts, although they are also subject to operational problems and difficulties. What is the balance of the EU's role in the process of targeting peace and security architecture in Africa? What aspects should be assessed, in that regard, in the medium and long term? Sixth and last, the conflict, peace and security reality in the African continent has experienced important changes in the last decade.

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These changes suggest the confirmation of the improvement in some aspects and, therefore, question the prevailing Afro-pessimistic analysis of the 80s and 90s, showing as well the emergence of new threats and challenges that draw a changing and complex future scenario. What is the most objective balance in peace and security in Africa in the current context of celebration of the 50th anniversary of the independences? How should the new social and international dynamics, the new security challenges and the possible scenarios in the medium and long term be assessed? what role could Peace research play in this analysis?

4. EXPERIMENTAL

This experimental research is divided into subsections, the qualitative research method is used because the concept of conflict is an historical and social phenomenon. It is an inquiry conducted to develop insights on human behavior in order to understand the way people think, feel, toward the African independence. The sampling is non random and the context is specific, also the study is inductive because we generate hypothesis, question, and proposition then it is observed. The data used are: journals, books, portfolio, and theses.

5. CONCLUSION

The reflections and some of the conclusions raised by this depiction we insist, essentially descriptive are relevant to the debate on the present and future of peace and security in Africa. First, the evolution in the recent years, particularly in the last decade, suggests a positive trend of fewer major armed conflicts. However, some scenarios such as Darfur, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia are serious security challenges for the continent. Moreover, a significant number of countries are still subject to military coups and political instability, in some cases, closely related to electoral processes. How could these armed conflict and political tension scenarios evolve? What role should the different African and international agencies, and the various African political and social actors play? Second, it would appear that the holding of elections in most African contexts over the past two decades has not been accompanied by an improvement in governance indicators.

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