



Brexit: the future UK EU relationship

سلطان البريكست: علاقة المملكة المتحدة البريطانية والاتحاد الأوروبي في المستقبل

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Abstract

The United Kingdom stopped being a member of the European Union on 31 January 2020, but that is not the end of the Brexit story. After this date, UK and EU officials will try to agree what the future relationship will eventually look like. A principled Brexit means respecting the result of the referendum and the decision of the UK public to take back control of the UK's laws, borders and money. And doing so, many aspects and behavior will change in the future for both sides, in a way that will certainly affect the EU- UK's national life.

Keywords: Brexit, Trade, Transitional Period, European Union, United Kingdom, Negotiations.

ملخص

توقفت المملكة المتحدة عن كونها عضوًا في الاتحاد الأوروبي في 31 جانفي 2020، لكن هذه ليست نهاية قصة خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي. بعد هذا التاريخ، سيحاول مسؤولو المملكة المتحدة والاتحاد الأوروبي الاتفاق على شكل العلاقة المستقبلية. يعني خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي المبني على احترام نتيجة الاستفتاء وقرار جمهور المملكة المتحدة باستعادة السيطرة على قوانين المملكة المتحدة وحدودها وأموالها. وبذلك، ستتغير العديد من الجوانب والسلوك في المستقبل لكلي الطرفين، بطريقة من المؤكد أنها سوف تؤثر على الحياة الوطنية للاتحاد الأوروبي والمملكة المتحدة. الكلمات المفتاحية: البريكست، السوق، الاتحاد الأوروبي، المملكة المتحدة البريطانية، مفاوضات، المرحلة الانتقالية.

I. INTRODUCTION

To be valid, the Brexit has dominated the media and political landscape of the United Kingdom since the referendum of 2016. One interesting side effect of this has been the way the EU, still the UK's nearest and largest trading partner, has been discussed solely in terms of its role in the Brexit negotiations. Yet whatever the outcome of these discussions, what the EU is and does will continue to affect not only its citizens but also the UK itself.

Furthermore, the Brexit reveals the impact of political turbulence on conventional party politics and entails large changes to British institutions and public policies from leaving the EU. In addition, it is an economic and political union involving 27 European countries. It allows free trade, which means goods can move between member countries without any checks or extra charges. The latter, also allows free movement of people, to live and work in whichever country they choose. The UK joined in 1973, when it was known as the European Economic Community, and became the first member state to leave. It formally left the EU on 31 January 2020 and immediately entered into an 11 months transition period.

Besides, during this period, the UK will continue to follow all of the EU's rules and its trading relationship will remain the same. However, it is no longer part of the EU's political institutions. This means that there are no longer any British members in the European Parliament. Indeed, the transition period will end on 31 December 2020. So our study will focus on the future nature of relationship among EU and UK.

-Theoretical and methodological foundations of the research:

First, having left the EU, the UK is now in a transition period. This transition period is expected to run to the end of December 2020. The UK is still subject to EU rules during this period even though it is no longer a Member State. While the WA allows for the transition period to be extended, the Government has said that it does not want an extension and has legislated to prevent one. After that, negotiations, at least on an initial agreement, will therefore have to be completed before the end of year and ratified in time for new arrangements to be in place for the beginning of 2021. Whilst, the negotiations are expected to cover a range of issues such as the future trade relationship, fisheries, aviation, security co-operation, governance and dispute resolution.

-The problematic:

This study, also will center on the changes that will have the concept of Brexit on EU and UK boards. Also, how it will affect them. For doing so, we have opted to ask the following problematic: How the future relationship between EU and UK will work? And what benefits it will deliver for both sides?

-The hypothesis of the study:

- The future relationship between the EU and UK would be affected by the process of the negotiations. Due to many reasons, such as the interests of both sides might be different.
- The integration of the Europe Union as an international organization would be certainly different comparing with the previous model of integration.
- The trade is the most important point to negotiate, because, economy is the center of the development.

-The aim of the study:

This study aims to predict a new perception of the future relationship between EU and UK, and of course the impact of the Brexit upon both sides. Also this study has on purpose to have an idea about what comes next the transitional period fixed to the December 31th 2020.

-Justifications for choosing a topic:

Brexit is a topic that fascinated a lot of researchers and people having interests on it, so, it is an important concept to be discovered, discussed, and explained through this study using theories of International Relations, such as; Constructivism and realism. Also the study has on purpose predicting the future relationship of EU and UK.

-The importance of the study:

The aim of our work is to reflect on Brexit , which is an exemplification of disintegration tendencies, through the lenses of theories of European integration in order to find out how well the two match each other. We also try to identify the dynamics Brexit may provoke in theoretical research and in the future of European integration. In order to answer this problematic we will follow the plan as shown:

1. Theoretical Explanation of the Brexit.

Clearly, Brexit or 'British exit' refers to the UK leaving the EU. Where, a public vote known as a referendum was held in June 2016, when 17.4 million people opted for the Brexit. This gave the Leave side 52%, compared with 48% for Remain.

1.1. The Realism perspective of the Brexit

Realists view international relations with its founders such as Gideon Rose , Robert Jervis, and Collin Dueck, as defined by the distribution of power around the international system. In addition, a key element of the theory remains that decision makers 'and their state ' act in calculated, rational ways to maximise the national interest. Of course, the power that Britain or the EU has in Brexit is therefore shaped by structural factors such as material capabilities such as: wealth or military power, and how decision makers use them. (Czech 2019)

Therefore, Neoclassical Realism helps us understand how the UK or the EU handle the constraints they face in Brexit. First, the UK risks overstretch given the remaining EU's \$13.8 trillion economy dwarfs that of the UK's \$2.4 trillion. Second, Britain has its military power on the table in the form of its commitment to NATO, runs a considerable trade deficit with the remaining EU. Third, the election of Donald Trump and Russian behaviour towards Eastern Europe create a European political and security system in flux. As a result, for the remaining EU, the biggest challenge may be in finding the necessary unity in decision-making. That is to say that the EU is not a traditional state and as such may struggle to wield its capabilities in a calculated and coherent way. (Czech 2019)

1.2 The constructivism perspective of the Brexit

In other hand, Constructivism with its pioneers such as Alexener Wendt, Nicholas Onuf, and Thomas Risse focus on the norms, conventions and rules which make up

international and European politics. It is not material capabilities that matter as much as how 'we' view our place in the world. As such, constructivists focus on how identities are formed and their role in foreign policy making. (Nugroho 2018) In the context of Brexit, the national interests of Britain or the EU will be shaped by who they think they are and what role they think they should pursue in the world. (Rosamond 2016)

Moreover, for constructivists any understanding of Brexit will require an explanation of the way in which the UK and the remaining EU's construct their identities and how these play out vis-à-vis each other. As well as , Britain's self-image of itself as a great power and ideas of 'parliamentary sovereignty' can be used to explain its approach, as will the EU's commitment to 'ever closer union' or ideas over the free movement of people. (Rosamond 2016)

Along with, Theresa May has been accused of putting politics before economics in her approach to Brexit negotiations. The remaining EU, as Eurosceptics rightly point out, is a political project, and so could also put political ideas before economics. There are several causes and reasons to the UK divorce with Europe. In this article, trying to understand Brexit phenomenon, is basically related with the illustration of causes and reasons why UK opted for of it.

1-3-The Relations with the EU

Firstly, Britain's history differs from that of its European neighbours. Its position as an unconquered island nation, a long tradition of parliamentary democracy and an ingrained sense that ultimately it can look after itself, marks it out from other European nations. It was never that sympathetic to the European ideal. (Hayward et Ben 2020) Further, it joined in 1973, but the drip drip effect of forty years of negative media coverage was difficult to reverse in a four month referendum campaign. The same as , Britain is not the only European country where politicians agree something in Brussels, then go home and blame Brussels for the decision. But in Britain the game was played with far greater intensity and on a greater scale than in other states. (Stockemer 2018)

Secondly, a more recent distinctive British act, which also had a significant part to play in the referendum result, was the 2003 decision of the Blair government to permit full freedom of movement rights to all the 2004 accession states. As a consequence, on 1 January 2004, full free movement was extended by the United Kingdom, as well as Ireland, to all the 10 accession states, from Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, Cyprus and Malta. All the other Western European Member States except Sweden maintained their Treaty rights to suspend full free movement of workers for seven years. As a fact that, the UK, Ireland and Sweden were the only three states which provided full free movement the number of people seeking work in the UK from the CEE and Baltic states surged.

Clearly, it was a British decision not to exercise their Treaty rights to restrict free movement. Nevertheless, in the EU Referendum campaign it was not difficult for the Leave campaigners to pin the surge of workers into the UK, on the EU, and not the British government. (Rosamond 2016)

Therefore, this influx was reinforced by the economic crisis. As the Eurozone failed to deliver growth across its 19 members, and the economy of debtor nations contracted sharply, more people arrived from southern Europe and Ireland.

Thirdly, the British economy rapidly righted itself after the crisis, as the UK was in control of its own currency, and debt and could deploy effective fiscal stabilizers. However, London then found that because of the Eurozone's addiction to fiscally rigid economic policies, the UK was also acting as the employment shock absorber for Frankfurt. (Stockemer 2018)

Nevertheless, the sheer volume of people moving to the UK from the CEE states, and from southern Europe appears to have been a major factor in driving the Leave vote. It is noticeable, in parts of the country, such as London and the major cities, where there had long been foreign communities; the British were much more relaxed about immigration and voted heavily to stay in the Union.

However, in parts of the country which had recently seen a surge of new foreign workers, they voted heavily to leave. This means that the Leave vote also surged in parts of the country where there was very little new or historical immigration, but where voters feared that immigration might also soon arrive in their neighborhoods. (Hayward et Ben 2020)

So, even these specifically British causes of the referendum leave vote were heavily influenced by European actions and developments. There are also a number of common worries, concerns and anger about the European Union across the continent and which in the UK reinforced the Leave vote.

Finally, the most obvious is the failure of the Euro-zone to either reform itself so it has the same capability as any other sovereign issuer of currency to pool debt, and provide the transfers and fiscal stabilizers to run a single currency zone. Or organize a soft Euro exit strategy for the states with whom Germany principally is not prepared to pool debts and fiscal transfer policies. (Anand 2020)

Technically of course, one can say that the UK is not a member of the Euro-zone and therefore of what concern is it to London? However, as explained above, extremely damaging fiscal policies in Frankfurt and Brussels have a direct impact on the UK, flooding Britain with more people looking for work. Equally it reduces the value of the single market to the UK, as Euro-zone fiscal rigidity squeezes economic growth. (Anand 2020)

In this article, the aim is to explain the relationship's type between the EU and the UK, also the challenging situation of the negotiations among the two sides. The relations with the EU has never been in a good terms, this means, from a historical perspective speaking, the joining was gradually late comparing with the other members.

First of all, although prominent figures on both sides have emphasized that they want the future partnership between the UK and the EU to be close and special, considerable uncertainty surrounds the next phase of the negotiations. This is despite the greater clarity brought by the December 2019 general election.

As well as the challenge of identifying a landing zone that is acceptable to both the UK and the EU, the climate within which the negotiations take place, the continuing reluctance of the UK government to spell out the trade-offs, and, potentially, a greater spread of views among the EU27 than in the first phase, could cause difficulties. (De Mars et Fella 2020)

Not only the government's majority gives control over the choice of future options, but also the Withdrawal Act lays the groundwork for regulatory autonomy, while its solution to the Irish border question allows the UK to make the trade deals with partners across the globe that were ruled out under the backstop. But the majority and the Johnson version of the withdrawal deal also carry potential difficulties. Moreover, the magnitude of Boris Johnson's victory has convinced some Brexiters that the UK's hand has been strengthened in the negotiations with the EU, not least because they believe the credibility of the no deal threat is even greater. (De Mars et Fella 2020)

However, the government has yet to explain to the British public the trade-offs that leaving the EU entails and especially the economic impact, the likely increase in 'red tape', and a growth rather than a contraction of the machinery of government. (Menon 2020)

Along with, the talk of the UK and the EU negotiating as one sovereign power to another, meanwhile, fails to recognize the asymmetry of the negotiations. The government is again pinning hopes on its ability to divide and conquer in the second phase, and not afraid to go public on this view. The Prime Minister has also ruled out the possibility of an extension to the transition period beyond December 2020, despite warnings that 11 months is too little even to reach anything more than the barest of trade agreements which would lead to maximum differentiation between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Downing Street does not exclude a piecemeal agreement, which leaves some issues unresolved, but allows the UK to depart the EU. (Menon 2020)

Moreover, even that sort of deal would be complex. The EU will demand assurances on fair competition as the price for agreement to zero tariffs and zero quotas on goods, potentially at odds with the government's aim of regulatory autonomy. The Prime Minister's insistence that a free trade agreement must cover services as well will be difficult to deliver. (De Mars et Fella 2020)

In this study, the focus is on clarification of the future atmosphere of EU-UK. While, the UK is likely to put future rights for UK citizens in the EU, which the EU said could not be discussed in the first phase, back on the agenda. Whereas, on the EU side, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, EU negotiator Michel Barnier and other leaders have stated their desire and willingness to reach an agreement with the UK, but have also been clear about the EU's red lines. Any rights must be balanced by obligations and a third country cannot enjoy the benefits of membership.

Also, they have expressed doubts that it will be possible to reach an agreement covering all the areas where the UK says it wants to negotiate before December 2020. The short timeframe will compel the EU27, who themselves have differing priorities, to agree the issues on which agreement has to be found. However, efforts on the EU side to impose sequencing are likely to be resisted by London.

Furthermore, the negotiations will cover a range of sensitive substantive issues: fish, data protection, intellectual property, energy, transport, and procedural questions such as the role of joint committees, where the UK and the EU are unlikely to see eye-to-eye. And, the relation will be affected too by how the UK is seen to be treating EU citizens in the UK under the settled status scheme. (Sampson 2020)

In this study, the main point is the procedure of settlement of Brexit, also what benefits would both sides have received. In fact, a no trade deal outcome is a possibility

in December 2020. But unlike leaving with no Withdrawal Agreement, citizens' rights, Ireland and the financial settlement would be settled and the less close a relationship the Johnson government seeks, the less difference not having a deal in place would make.

In addition to that, the UK and the EU have also stated that they want a strong security relationship in the future. But although co-operation on security issues and the exchange of intelligence is likely to continue, and the UK will of course remain part of NATO alongside other EU member states, it seems likely that the UK's involvement in EU policies will be looser than currently. (De Mars et Fella 2020)

As a result, the EU has indicated that it will not allow the UK access to tools in law enforcement and judicial cooperation that are restricted to member states and Schengen countries, the European Arrest Warrant, the Schengen Information System, and the European Criminal Record Information System, but that it is open to the development of alternative arrangements. The two sides will need to negotiate alternative provisions for access to a better future and neighborhood in Europe.

Though, any UK participation would require a financial contribution. Foreign policy is the area where change is least likely, partly because the Common Security and Defense Policy's is itself a loose framework and does not formally constrain EU member states in policy making, and partly because co-operation often takes place outside EU structures. Although the UK has insisted on the primacy of NATO, downplayed the role of the EU, and been a strong opponent of institutionalizing EU foreign policy, it has co-operated closely with France and Germany, and supported EU actions, such as the imposition of sanctions on Russia following its annexation of the Crimea, that further UK policies. So, UK co-operation with the EU or individual member states where interests coincide is likely to continue after Brexit. (Hall 2020)

In this study, it is shown that despite the stated desire on both sides for a close and special relationship, it is not at all clear what the negotiations can or will deliver. It is unclear how far the UK has worked through the full implications of being a third country, nor how far the EU is prepared to give the UK a special third country deal.

2. The UK-EU Trade Talks:

During this period, the UK will continue to follow all of the EU's rules and its trading relationship will remain the same. However, it is no longer part of the EU's political institutions, so there are no longer any British MEPs in the European Parliament.

This study focuses on Trade and economy mainly, due to its highly importance and heavy consequences on both sides. Also, it focuses on the Transitional period as a main point of the study, in order to try to overcome the ambiguity on the future relationships EU-UK.

2.1 Trade

To start with, in 2018, UK exports of goods and services totaled £650 billion and imports close to £700 billion. Combined, this equates to two-thirds of UK GDP. The government has announced its intention to complete a trade deal with the EU before the end of 2020 while starting trade talks with the US.

Both sets of negotiations will need to tackle three issues: trade in goods, trade in services, and domestic regulation and government support for domestic industry. On the third, trade agreements often work to ensure a 'level playing field' for competition among businesses by including rules covering regulation and government subsidies. (Hall 2020)

First, trade deals with the EU and the US are important, because they are the UK's top trading partners for goods and services; roughly half of total UK trade is with the EU. The US is next in line, accounting for around 14% of British exports in the last five years. Important products include vehicles, machinery and pharmaceuticals, though only 8% of British imports originate in the US.

This study shows that since 2016, doubts over the question of whether the UK would remain in the EU customs union for goods forestalled much substantive discussion over future UK domestic policy. Now, however, Boris Johnson's Withdrawal Agreement clarified that Northern Ireland would remain aligned with the EU in many areas (customs, VAT, regulation), while the rest of the UK would be free to proceed with a free trade agreement that allows for greater divergence from EU policies. (Hall 2020)

That is to say that both UK and EU have expressed their desire to secure an extensive free trade agreement, the UK has insisted it would like free trade in goods and services while the EU has been more coy, it desires free trade in goods, is less clear about the extent of services trade, and has made it clear that any deal will require British commitments to a level playing field. (Trond 2020)

This article indicates some points about the future trade issues. First, under an EU-UK free trade agreement, the UK would have regulatory autonomy, and be able to decide its own policies on foods standards, environment, and labor market laws. In practice, the EU will ask the UK align its policies with some EU norms in exchange for greater access to the EU market.

Second, if the UK wanted to relax consumer product or food safety standards, the EU might be reluctant to offer zero tariffs or expedited customs clearance to British goods. For financial services, free cross-border trade would require a deep level of regulatory alignment or regulatory equivalence arrangements.

Third, negotiating tariffs for manufacturers in most sectors will be most straightforward. More difficult will be agricultural products, many of which are subject to quotas. The trickiest areas relate to the extent to which producers receive state support/subsidies and the stringency of various regulatory standards. (Bailey 2020)

Fourth, in one hand UK farmers may be concerned if European subsidies to farmers undercut their competitiveness while their European counterparts will balk at any prospect of lower standards conferring a cost advantage. In other hand, the EU for its part will fret about what the UK may need to agree to secure a trade deal with the US, and will want assurances of domestic enforcement of EU standards as well. (Bailey 2020)

In short, while services make up four-fifths of the UK economy, they are less than half of total trade. They represented only about 44% of total UK exports and just more than one-quarter of total UK imports in 2018. More than 40% of services exports head

to the EU, whilst, as with goods exports, the US is the next most important destination, receiving more than one-fifth of British services exports in 2018. About half of the UK's services exports in recent years have been other business services, such as management consulting or engineering services (around 30%) and financial services around 20%. (Chéron 2019)

Recently, released experimental statistics from the Office for National Statistics found that two-thirds of all services exports and 89% of financial services were sold via cross-border supply, i.e. an entity in Britain selling the service abroad without sending a person to the foreign country. (De Mars et Fella 2020)

We can say that negotiating a trade deal for cross-border services such as these is more complicated than a deal for goods because assessing and/or regulating the safety and quality of a service provided by a foreign entity can be difficult and there is no border checkpoint. This means the methods and procedures for ensuring the service satisfies the importing country's standards, e.g. equivalence arrangements, must be carefully laid out in the agreement.

In sum, the future UK-EU relationship will entail a series of trade-offs, more alignment with EU regulations and standards will facilitate more trade because alignment itself can reduce the cost of trading internationally for UK and EU firms, and because the EU will be willing to provide lower tariffs for goods and freer access to more sub-sectors within services.

However, in some sectors more alignment with the EU might be undesirable to British businesses and citizens who see greater autonomy over specific policy areas as more valuable than a deeper trading relationship.

The study aims to demonstrate that the Transition Period is a crucial phase for both sides, especially that this latter is facing the COVID19, where the negotiations are disrupting, within the consequences of the lockdown. May be an extending of the transition period is possible. (Ewa 2020)

2.3 Extending of the Transitional Period:

3.2.1 Before July:

First, the UK has said it will not make use of the provision in Article 132 of the Withdrawal Agreement to extend transition. This says: "Notwithstanding Article 126, the Joint Committee may, before 1 July 2020, adopt a single decision extending the transition period for up to one or two years."

Then, from the point of view of the EU, this is an easy option. However, it poses more problems for the UK. In addition, Boris Johnson's manifesto commitment that he would not ask for an extension was enshrined in the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) 2020 Act, which states that a "Minister of the Crown may not agree in the Joint Committee to an extension of the implementation period." If there were to be an extension, this provision would need to be repealed. Therefore, it is possible that a minister may amend this Act by negative resolution.

That would allow this prohibition to be removed and the date of the end of the transition, currently 31 December 2020 at 11.00 pm, to be changed without the need for a new bill. (Tessaromatis 2016)

As result, some, however, argue that these changes need to be done by Act of Parliament. With a majority of 80, of course, this could be done relatively easily, even in the face of opposition from the government's backbenches. Some opposition parties, the Scottish and Welsh governments, and the Northern Ireland Assembly have all made clear that they think the UK government should request an extension, in the light of the Covid-19 crisis. Thus, the Labor party has not called for an extension but has said it will hold the government to its pledge that it can conclude a deal in the time available.

This article's aim is to evince the stock take Brexit negotiations. Ultimately, the roadblock to an extension is not legislative but political, and comes from within the government's own ranks. While some polling provides support for the claim that voters backed a delay to ending transition, it equally points to the widely different views held by Remain and Leave voters. Whilst the former largely favored delay, more Leave voters were opposed to than favored an extension. Given that nearly three quarters of leave voters backed the Conservatives in December 2019, more Tory voters oppose an extension than support it.

3.2.2 After July:

Even if the government does not seek an extension before the 1 July deadline, it is possible that the two sides may agree on the need for one later, perhaps to finalize the detail of negotiations, or to allow time for ratification. Were the government to seek such an extension, a number of possible legal routes have been suggested.

First, under international law, it has been argued that extending the transition period would constitute an amendment to an existing agreement, so Article 50 could still be used as a legal basis. However, many EU lawyers argue that, after Brexit day, the Article 50 is no longer applied to the UK. Others note that international law applies only to states, and that the EU is not a state.

Second, as a variation to the above, EU member states and the UK could enter into an international agreement outside EU law to agree an extension. However, this seems difficult legally because an extension would extend EU law and so the EU would need a legal basis to act. There are a number of other legal bases in the Treaty such as Articles 207 and 217, but again these might well need unanimous agreement of the Council, and if the agreement touches areas of member state competence then it would be a mixed agreement requiring national and regional ratification. Also the Court of Justice may also be required to give its opinion. All of this takes time. (Tessaromatis 2016)

Third, the UK might be able to reach an agreement with the EU by 31 December 2020 that envisages a fairly lengthy implementation period to disapply existing EU law and to enter into the new arrangements over a number of years to come. However, this would need a legal basis in the Treaty and would likely be a mixed agreement, which would again require national and regional ratification; this would have to be done by early Autumn 2020.

Fourth, it has been suggested that a decision of the Joint Committee, established under the Withdrawal Agreement, might be used to agree a new extension. However,

while the committee can amend the Withdrawal Agreement itself, the powers do not include amending Articles 126: the expiry date of the transition period, or Article 132: the provision allowing extension of the transition.

Finally, Article 352 TFEU, which is the EU's residual legal basis to attain one of the objectives of the Treaty, has been suggested as a potential option. However, these objectives do not include withdrawing from the EU, and this provision can be used only where no provision in the Treaty provides for action to attain the objective, and Article 50 does that. Further, Declarations 41 and 42 make clear that Article 352 cannot be used to widen the scope of Union powers. (Bailey 2020)

In a summery, all of these points to a need for a decision to be taken on extension by 30 June 2020. Clearly, one should not underestimate the ingenuity of EU lawyers or their ability to come up with some imaginative solution if need be - particularly if governments are demanding this. However it remains the case that it is far from certain a legal basis for post 30 June extension could be found.

3. The Negotiation and Timetable for the Brexit

The negotiations are expected to cover a range of issues such as the future trade relationship, fisheries, aviation, security co-operation, governance and dispute resolution. In this study, the main goal is to predict the future trade relationship between both sides, and the results of Brexit in short and long terms.

3.1 The EU-UK objectives

To begin with, assuming there is no extension to the transition period; an agreement between the UK and EU must be negotiated and ratified by the end of 2020. In one hand, many have commented that this is a very tight timetable, and have contrasted it with other trade agreements, which have taken several years to negotiate.

In other hand, not all commentators agree with this assessment, however, and the UK's chief negotiator David Frost has pointed to the Treaty of Rome of 1957, establishing the European Economic Community, which was negotiated in nine months. The European Commission has published a timetable which envisages an initial agreement by October 2020, leaving time for ratification at the end of the year, and with negotiations on outstanding issues to continue in 2021. (Stockemer 2018)

Moreover, the government has said that it hopes the broad outline of an agreement will be clear by the high level meeting in June between the parties envisaged by the Political Declaration and that the agreement could be finalised by September. If this is not the case, the government may walk away from the negotiations. (Trond 2020)

Over and above this, Parliament will have a limited formal role in negotiating and approving the future relationship with the EU. Consequently, the provisions of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 CRAG will apply. While in theory this gives the House of Commons the power to delay ratification of a Treaty indefinitely, in practice the CRAG powers are widely regarded as being limited. So, no Treaty has ever been blocked using these powers.

Furthermore, the original October 2019 version of the EU Withdrawal Agreement Bill included provisions giving the House of Commons a role in approving the

Government's negotiating mandate and the agreements themselves. These provisions were removed from the later version of the Bill which passed into law as the *EU Withdrawal Agreement Act 2020*. (Hayward et Ben 2020)

Also, the EU is conducting negotiations on the same legal basis as its other negotiations with non-EU countries. That is why future agreements will require approval by Member States in the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. Where agreements go beyond the EU's exclusive competences, they will also require ratification by national and, in some cases, regional parliaments. (Menon 2020)

This study aims on showing the UK-EU objectives basically based on good relations and cooperation for the near and far future.

3.2 The UK objectives

In addition, the Government is aiming for a relationship with the EU based on friendly co-operation between sovereign equals. Well as the Government is looking for a free trade agreement with the EU similar to that which the EU has agreed with other countries, such as Canada. This would involve no tariffs or quotas on UK-EU trade, although a few tariffs remain on EU-Canada trade under their trade agreement. Also, the UK is ruling out regulatory alignment with the EU, jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and supranational control over the UK in any area of the proposed agreements. In particular, the UK will not agree to be bound by level playing field obligations, such as, for example, rules on government subsidies to industry, workers' rights and environmental protection. (Czech 2019)

In short, the Government has made it clear that the UK is leaving the EU single market and customs union and, as noted, will not agree to regulatory alignment. This will allow the UK greater economic and regulatory freedom, including an independent trade policy. It will also mean, however, greater friction in relation to trade with the EU. The Government has confirmed that there will be checks on imports into Great Britain from the EU. (Ewa 2020)

3.3 The EU objectives

Similarly, the EU has said it wants to have a partnership with the UK which is as close as possible. This would involve an economic partnership, a security partnership and co-operation on other issues. These would be under a single overarching governance structure with a dispute resolution system in which the CJEU provides interpretations of questions of EU law. (Capriglione 2020)

The like manner, the EU agrees that the aim of the negotiations should be to ensure zero-tariff and zero-quota trade between the UK and EU. The EU is, however, only prepared to grant this privileged access to its market if the UK agrees to robust level playing field commitments and an agreement on fisheries providing continuity in access to UK waters.

Likewise by, the EU's proposed security partnership would involve co-operation in foreign affairs and defence matters, as well as law enforcement and judicial co-operation. So, the EU's detailed objectives are set out in its negotiating directives of 25 February 2020. (Anand 2020)

This study objects to give details on the transitional period, and if an extending period is possible, by dint of the ongoing COVID-19 crisis. The EU and UK negotiators have agreed to continue negotiations in April, May and June via video conference. The next negotiating rounds will start on the following dates: 20 July and 17 August 2020. (Edgington 2020)

3.4 Context of the negotiations

To start with, the UK has been part of a common system of regulation and or common policies with the EU in many areas. For some form of co-operation to continue in these areas, the UK and the EU will need to agree new frameworks for managing this co-operation. The negotiations will be unusual in a number of ways when compared to negotiations on trade and other areas of policy co-operation elsewhere. As highlighted in the PD, the UK and EU have built up a close economic and trading relationship over more than 45 years.

Each party is an important trading partner of the other and integrated supply chains, spanning the UK and EU, have been developed. Trade agreements usually have the objective of removing trade barriers between two or more partners, and negotiations in other policy areas are also usually about bringing partners closer together. In the case of the UK and EU, this negotiation will involve creating a framework for managing a relationship that will be more distant to that of before.

Also, the UK-EU agreement on the future relationship will increase barriers to trade regardless of how detailed and in-depth the negotiations are. Therefore, in moving out of the single market and into a more regular 'free trade' agreement, the UK will encounter barriers in trading with the EU even where it does not change any of the rules applicable to trade from when it was a Member State. The UK could agree to follow EU rules in some areas, but if it did so there would still need to be agreement on a new framework to ensure that it followed the agreed rules in order to prevent non-tariff barriers appearing. (De Mars & Fella, 2020)

Furthermore, existing co-operation between the EU and the UK goes beyond the economic and related spheres and what would normally be covered by a trade agreement. This has involved, for example, close judicial and law enforcement co-operation. Future co-operation in these areas could be covered by separate agreements. The PD refers to agreements in the plural, while making reference to an overarching institutional framework covering a set of linked agreements. (De Mars & Fella, 2020)

In addition, the EU wants to avoid a similar relationship to the one that it has with Switzerland, with which it has multiple agreements without a coherent governance structure. Then, the degree of co-operation in different policy areas and the governance of the UK-EU relationship are issues to be settled in the negotiations. But in its statements, the EU has indicated there will be linkages between progress in some policy areas and greater trade access.

The UK and EU agreed in paragraph 126 that overall administration of the future relationship should take place via a Joint Committee, responsible for management, supervision, and dispute resolution as related to the future relationship. Further details about the work of the Joint Committee or its makeup are left deliberately vague in the Political Declaration.

On dispute settlement, the Political Declaration sets out in paragraphs 129-132 that the parties envisage a two-step dispute resolution system that is not dissimilar from that set up by the Withdrawal Agreement: the first stage is discussion and consultation between the parties, including through the Joint Committee where necessary. Mediation should also be available for the parties. The second stage is referring a dispute to an independent arbitration panel, which will issue binding decisions. Where the arbitration panel has to interpret EU law, it must refer questions about the meaning of that EU law to the CJEU. Where there is non-compliance with any part of the future relationship agreement, the agreement itself will stipulate what obligations under the relationship either party can suspend temporarily in response to a breach. (Stockemer, 2018)

Finally, the Political Declaration states in paragraph 134 that parties can temporarily take measures that would ordinarily be in breach of the future relationship where “significant economic, societal or environmental difficulties” necessitate this – though a decision to take such “safeguard measures” is subject to arbitration, where necessary.

II. Methods and Materials:

We take two most influential theories of IRS, i.e. realism and constructivism, and attempt to analyze Brexit by means of their main assumptions and internal logic. We use the historical method so as to show the process of the integrity of the UK and EU throughout time. We also use the descriptive method in order to describe, and try to give a vivid image about the Brexit phenomenon. After that, we use the induction method by using available information to predict the type of the future relationship between both sides mainly dealing with trade.

III. Results and discussion :

-First, the Political Declaration indicates a number of key dates by which decisions are expected, notably in relation to data protection, financial services and fisheries. Also, the transition period lasts until the end of 2020. While it can be extended, the Government has said it will not ask for it to be. If there was a request to extend the transition period, the WA states that this would need to be agreed by the UK and EU by 1 July 2020. Presuming there is no extension to the transition period, an agreement on the future relationship will need to be negotiated and ratified by the end of 2020 in order for new arrangements to be in place on 1 January 2021. These dates provide us with a timeline for the rest of 2020.

-In this study, the Transition Period Timeline is one of the most important key to justify, clarify, and understand the process of the negotiations. First of all, The Government has said that it hopes the broad outline of an agreement would be clear by June’s high level meeting between the parties with a view to the agreement being finalized by September. But if this is not the case, the Government may walk away from the negotiations.

-Then, the Institute for Government highlights a number of implications of the aim to complete the negotiations on the future relationship by the end of 2020. Also, the UK will need to limit its ambitions in the negotiations. Namely, it is unlikely those areas which impinge on Member State competence, for example: intellectual property and

mutual recognition of professional qualification could be included, as these would require ratification in each of the Member States.

-In addition to that, the EU is likely to use the UK's wish to get a deal done by the end of 2020 as leverage. If the UK wishes to reach a deal by then, it is likely that it will have to make concessions.

-To sum up, the transition, sometimes called the implementation period, will end on 31 December 2020. It cannot be extended beyond that date. Also, in the transition, the UK remains in both the EU customs union and single market. That means, until the transition ends, most things will stay the same. This includes:

- Travelling to and from the EU, including the rules around driving licences and pet passports.
- Freedom of movement, the right to live and work in the EU and vice versa.
- UK-EU trade, which will continue without any extra charges or checks being introduced.

- In short, the idea behind the transition period is to give some breathing space while new UK-EU negotiations take place. Whilst, these talks will determine what the future relationship will eventually look like. Therefore, negotiations started in March and both sides have agreed to intensify talks over the summer.

-The Brexit process has already created strains in the relationships between the constituent territories that make up the UK. In part, these strains emerged from the divergent preferences that were evident in the 2016 referendum, and that have remained evident since then. The UK as a whole has left the EU, but without the consent of the majority in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

-In addition to that, In the first place, there are the negotiations. And these will require trade-offs to be made. Credit where credit is due, this government has gone further than its predecessor in acknowledging that things cannot stay the same when the UK leave the EU. But, even so, they've been less than straightforward with them.

IV. Conclusion:

To conclude, many UK firms that provide a service to the EU through cross-border supply have already set up the necessary commercial presence a subsidiary in the EU to ensure, they can continue to deliver services regardless of the outcome of the trade negotiations. While this makes sense for the individual businesses, also the UK economy will lose the tax revenue generated by this activity. More, without a deal to facilitate cross-border services exports, Britain will lose these service-sector, jobs as corporations move more of their workers to Europe. Indeed, more recent analysis has suggested that while more voters are in favour of an extension than oppose it, Leave voters remain opposed, albeit that explicit reference to delays caused by the corona virus outbreak tempers this opposition somewhat.

In addition, the transition period and other aspects of the UK's departure were agreed in a deal called the withdrawal agreement. Most of that was negotiated by Theresa May's government. But after Boris Johnson replaced her as prime minister in

July 2019, he negotiated some changes to it. Aside from trade, many other aspects of the future UK-EU relationship will also need to be decided during the transition. For example: law enforcement, data sharing and security, aviation standards and safety, access to fishing waters, supplies of electricity and gas, licensing and regulation of medicines.

Besides, the Government proposes that agreements in other areas, for example on fishing, aviation, nuclear co-operation, law enforcement, and judicial co-operation, would be separate to the trade agreement. It foresees all these agreements as distinct with their own governance arrangements, as opposed to a single overarching 'framework' agreement. Moreover, the Government does not view foreign affairs co-operation as requiring a treaty framework. As a result, The UK's detailed negotiating position was published on 27 February 2020. This means that the UK left the European Union on 31 January, but that is not the end of the Brexit story. Because the UK is now in an 11-month period, known as the transition that keeps the UK bound to the EU's rules.

Despite many things staying the same, the UK has already left the EU's political institutions, including the European Parliament and European Commission. So, while the UK will no longer have any voting rights, it will continue to follow EU rules during the transition. For example, the European Court of Justice will have the final say over any legal disputes. As a result, the transition means that the UK will continue to contribute to the EU's budget.

Moreover, assuming there is no extension to the transition period; an agreement between the UK and EU must be negotiated and ratified by the end of 2020. Many have commented that this is a very tight timetable and have contrasted it with other trade agreements which have taken several years to negotiate.

Not all commentators agree with this assessment, however, and the UK's chief negotiator David Frost has pointed to the Treaty of Rome of 1957, establishing the European Economic Community, which was negotiated in nine months. The European Commission has published a timetable which envisages an initial agreement by October 2020, leaving time for ratification at the end of the year, and with negotiations on outstanding issues to continue in 2021.

Also, the current constitutional framework puts Parliament in a weak position with regard to scrutiny of the UK-EU negotiations in comparison with the prerogatives that can be exercised by the European Parliament. But during the negotiations, select committees have a vital role to ensure that scrutiny takes place, and the Committee on the Future Relationship with the European Union is well placed to undertake and possibly coordinate scrutiny within Parliament. The practice adopted in relation to the scrutiny of the future UK-EU relationship will also impact the position of Parliament in negotiations on future international trade agreements.

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