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Algerian diplomacy toward the Libya crisis:

Stakes and principles

الدبلوماسية الجزائرية تجاه الأزمة الليبية بين الرهانات والمبادئ

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Abstract

A foreign policy is first of all a thought. It shapes the major orientations and expresses a vision of Algeria's international relations. Even if it is contingent, foreign policy does not function, unlike diplomacy, according to the circumstances of the moment, the mood of men, the whims of international time, or errors of route or course. A foreign policy is worth its weight in gold when its objectives are coherent. Foreign policy is not a public policy like any other. Therefore, to understand it, it must be thought out. This is the observation that I would like to illustrate in my discussion of Algerian diplomacy toward the Libyan crisis

Keywords: Algerian diplomacy, Libya, Arab Spring, International actors, Stakes and principles

الملخص باللغة العربية:

إذا كانت السياسة الخارجية هي مجموعة الأعمال والاهداف التي يسطرها ويقوم بتنفيذها جهاز متخصص للدولة من اجل تسيير علاقاتها مع دول أخرى أو أطراف دولية أخرى فان الدبلوماسية تمثل أولى الوسائل التي تلجأ إليها في سبيل تحقيق تلك الأهداف، رغم انها قد تصطدم بظروف دولية او سياسية قد تؤثر فيها. لكن ما يعطيها وزنها وقوتها هي التزامها بمبادئها واهدافها المنسجمة. ومن اجل فهم هذه الفكرة ارتأينا مناقشتها في هذه الورقة البحثية من خلال التطرق الى مثال حي وهو دور الدبلوماسية الجزائرية في حل الازمة الليبية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الدبلوماسية الجزائرية. الازمة الليبية. الربيع العربي. الفواعل الدولية. الرهانات والمبادئ

1. INTRODUCTION

Since our country's independence, foreign policy has expressed Algeria's desire to be politically and economically a fully self-determined state by giving meaning and concrete content to its sovereignty. This testifies to its ambition to organise itself and act on its own by directing its foreign policy towards its own strategy, free from the influence of the blocs, and clearly attests to its relationship with international life through an activity, a presence and an experience that have had a positive influence on certain developments in international relations. This is true of the enrichment of the policy of non-alignment, the launch of South-South cooperation and North-South dialogue, the control of conflict and the construction of

global security. This foreign policy is marked by constancy and coherence. Consistency in the principles defended and consistency in the actions undertaken. An analysis of the behaviour of Algerian diplomacy reveals the implementation of an independent policy based on the principles of non-interference, non-use of force or threats of force, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and the right of peoples to self-determination.

The actions of Algeria's diplomacy are aimed at the emancipation of peoples within the framework of international cooperation based on the equality of States, respect for sovereignty and the establishment of a just peace in the world.

Algeria's vision of international contributions dictates a behaviour and a style that are against alignment and automatic options. Its defence of just causes and its contribution to the establishment of a new international economic order, its commitment to dialogue, consultation and conflict resolution have been the guarantee of its international influence. It is seen as an element of regional equilibrium, a reinforcement of solidarity of developing countries and a quality partner to unravel the links necessary for the re-launch of dialogue on the management of regional integration and security processes and the promotion of cooperative ventures favouring peace and development, particularly in the Sahel-Saharan zone Mali or Libya

This article casts light on the following questions:

What is the nature of the crisis in Libya?

What are the foundations of Algerian diplomacy?

What is the position of the Algerian diplomacy toward the Libyan crisis?

2. Historical context of the crisis in Libya

The State of Libya gained independence from the Italian Republic in the late 1950s.. On 1 September 1969, Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi led a coup d'état that overthrew King Idriss, and in doing so, he ascended to power and ruled the country for four decades. Because of the enormous control exercised during the decades of dictatorship and the lack of freedoms, in February 2011, a civilian movement arose that brought down the Gaddafi government during the so-called Arab Spring. In March 2011, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established a no-fly zone and the implementation of measures for the protection of the Libyan population by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

In August of that year, the revolution won victory in Tripoli and the liberation of Libya was proclaimed on 23 October¹.

Muammar al-Gaddafi's regime was replaced by the government of the National Transitional Council (NTC). In 2012, the NTC handed over power to an elected parliament, the General National Congress (GNC). Voters elected a new parliament to replace the GNC in June 2014. The House of Representatives (HoR), moved to the eastern city of Tobruk after fighting broke out in Tripoli and Benghazi in July 2014²

In December 2015, the UN negotiated an agreement between a broad range of Libyan political parties and social groups, known as the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). Members of the Political Dialogue, including representatives of the House of Representatives and the General National Congress, signed the final document in December 2015. The LPA called for the formation of an interim Government of National Accord, with a nine-member Presidency Council, the General National Congress, and an advisory Council of State joined by the majority of former GNC members³.

The Libyan Political Agreement's roadmap for a transition to a new constitution and elected government was subsequently endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2259, which also called on member states to cease official contact with parallel institutions. In January 2016, the president voted to approve the Libyan Political Agreement, including the Presidency Council, while voting against a controversial provision on security leadership positions and the cabinet of ministers proposed by the Presidency Council.

In March 2016, the Presidency Council of the Government of National Accord (GNA) was

installed in Tripoli. In 2016, the GNA twice announced a list of ministers operating as actors, but the Human Rights Office did not approve the ministerial list. In September 2017, UN Special Representative Ghassan Salame announced a new roadmap for national political reconciliation. Salame's plan called for amendments to the Libyan Political Agreement, a national conference of Libyan leaders, and a constitutional referendum and general elections.

In November 2018, international partners endorsed the Salame Action Plan for Libya, which has an action Plan for Libya that aimed to break the political stalemate by holding a National Conference in Libya in 2019 that would provide a timetable for political transition. The National Conference was delayed due to the failure of the parties to implement a Salame-mediated agreement in Abu Dhabi on 27 February, and the subsequent military action by Kh alifa Haftar's Libyan National Army against Government of National Accord (GNA) forces in Tripoli that began in April 2019

3. Disputed sides in Libya

Although from 12 March 2016 there was an attempt to make a unitary Libyan government based in Tripoli viable, under the auspices of the United Nations, under the command of Fayeze al-Sarraj as Prime Minister and leader of the so-called Presidential Council, in practice the quarrels persisted, reflected in the coexistence of two parliaments and three governments.

As a result, power eventually rested with multiple armed militias, with ideological, religious and ethnic differences, all of them possessing multiple weapons, which they acquired after the Gaddafi administration's debacle.

In addition to the formal al-Sarraj government, also backed by the European

Union, Turkey and Qatar, the main contending groups at the time were :

- The Libyan National Army, led by General Khalifa Haftar, self-described as the main opponent of the Islamist militias, which is backed by the Tobruk-based government. He is supported by the US, Russia, France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who see their leader as the only one capable of stabilising the country and curbing jihadism.
- The "Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries", which groups together radical Islamic remnants such as "Islamic State", the Benghazi Defence Brigades and "Ansar al Sharia", the group that claimed responsibility for the 2012 assassination of the US Ambassador in Benghazi, Christopher Stevens. The main positions of these forces are around Sirte.
- The "Libyan Dawn" group, with influence in the west of the country, including areas of Misrata and Tripoli. Some of its members supported the UN-sponsored unity government.

In this troubled context, al-Sarraj saw, on 1 August 2016, a US airstrike on "Islamic State" strongholds near Sirte, it was the first such operation coordinated between Washington and his government

4. The Role of the United Nations

Facing this chaos situation, the United Nations launched in 2019 a mediation between the main militias, and especially between Tripoli and Tobruk.

After exhausting negotiations that were finally concluded in Skhirat (Morocco) on 17 December 2015, the UN succeeded in extracting a peace agreement, known as the

Libya Political Agreement (LPA), from some of the warring factions. A government of national unity was set up, the Government of National Accord (GNA), chaired by Fayeze el-Sarraj⁴

In this new configuration, the House of Representatives should have become the legislative body of Libya and the General National Congress an advisory body called the Council of State.

However, the Skhirat agreement proved to be a failure. Under the influence of Khalifa Haftar the House never recognised the authority of the government of Fayeze el-Sarraj, which had just been installed in Tripoli. As for the Fajr Libya coalition, which supported the the Tripoli Congress, was finally torn between those who would support Sarraj and the the UN peace process and those who will oppose it. Despite the international recognition international recognition, the authority of Sarraj and his GNA has remained dependent on the goodwill of the militias that support him.

At the same time, Marshal Haftar's credibility in Cyrenaica has only grown with his military victories, even extending to certain regions of Tripolitania thanks to a network of alliances with local tribes.

In conclusion, after Skhirat, Libya will remain divided between two rival and competing authorities, those in Tobruk and Tripoli, not to mention the other armed militias operating in the country. Therefore, the UN mediation is not finished, the ambition being now to integrate Haftar into a new government of national unity and to organise new elections. Provided, of course, that the security context allows it.

5. The role of the African Union (AU)

At the beginning of the crisis, the African Union (AU) proposed a roadmap that was accepted by the Libyan regime, providing for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the facilitation of humanitarian aid, the launch of a dialogue between the Libyan parties and the replacement of Muammar Gaddafi by his son Saif al-Islam with a view to initiating a political transition. But France categorically refuses this option.⁵

After the collapse of the Gaddafi regime and the situation worsened, the African Union called on the different parties to dialogue as it was against any military intervention or ingerence and insisted on a political and peaceful settlement of the Libyan crisis in accordance with the 2015 Skhirat Agreement.

6. The Role of The Arab league:

The Arab League affirmed its commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya" and rejected what it called foreign interference "of any kind".⁶

The Arab countries reaffirmed their support for the political process, which they said "requires the full implementation of the Skhirat agreement of December 2015" and called for greater involvement of neighbouring countries in international efforts to help Libyans resolve the crisis.

It also expressed "deep concern about the military escalation, which is exacerbating the crisis in Libya, threatening the security and stability of neighbouring countries and the region as a whole, including the Mediterranean".

The League stressed "the need to put an end to the military conflict", and insisted that a political settlement is the only solution to restore security and stability in Libya and eliminate terrorism.

A call to maintain international contacts to "prevent any foreign military intervention in Libya" was also made.

7 The Peace negotiations:

Despite the years of violence in Libya, attempts have continued at the multilateral level to broker agreements between the warring factions and to find a political solution to the crisis in the Arab country.

The latest of these agreements took place at the so-called Berlin Summit in January this 2020, when the leaders of the US, the European Union, Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Turkey and the host country, under the auspices of the United Nations, agreed to a permanent ceasefire, an arms embargo and an end to foreign military assistance to the Libyan factions.

However, the viability of this agreement was called into question, as Libya's top leaders refused to participate in the dialogue, although they did meet privately with German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

In addition, UN Secretary-General António Guterres denounced "a growing foreign intervention in Libya", calling on international powers to honour the commitments made at the Berlin meeting a few months ago.

In spite of this, Guterres assured that the United Nations would continue to seek to bring peace to Libya, and suggested the option of establishing demilitarised areas in certain parts of the country.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that tensions in the area escalated few months ago, after a Turkish warship prevented a French frigate from inspecting a Tanzanian vessel, which was allegedly carrying a shipment of arms to Libyan territory.

Likewise, the current scenario is marked by the advance towards Sirte - in the east of the country - of the contingents of the so-called "National Union" government (GNA), based in Tripoli and supported by the United Nations, which, with Turkish military support, are reportedly stalking the eastern Libyan city, which remains under the control of General Haftar.

8 the International actors and the Libyan crisis

a-The EU and the Libyan crisis:

After having provoked the fall of the regime in 2011, the Europeans preferred to keep a low profile and to put themselves in the shade, so as not to appear as powers interfering in the internal affairs of the Arab-Muslim world. The objective was to prove that the 2011 military operation wanted by France and the United Kingdom had been motivated by purely humanitarian considerations, and not by underlying strategic or economic interests. Other countries (Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Turkey, Sudan) would thus enter the field opened up by the Libyan crisis, supporting various armed factions opposed to each other, and thus fuelling the conflict until it degenerated.⁷

With the eruption of the second Libyan civil war, however, the summer of 2014 marked a turning point in European attitudes. When, in August, Western embassies were forced to flee Tripoli and temporarily relocate to Tunis, it was no longer possible to look the other way. The security stakes had become too high for the Old Continent. The Europeans were therefore forced to reinvest in the Libyan diplomatic arena in a more marked manner. This new engagement also coincided with the appointment, also in August 2014, of Federica Mogherini as the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and

Security Policy. An Italian national, Ms. Mogherini has been very active on the Libyan file, re-launching the EU's policy in that country.

This more assertive role in the Libyan crisis was therefore carried out through two main channels⁸:

That of the EU and, of course, that of traditional national diplomacy. The policy followed by the EU is without mystery; Brussels has put all its political weight behind the political weight in favour of the UN mediation, initiated by the then UN Special Representative Bernardino León of Spain. In this, it proved to be ally of the UN, and even threatened on several occasions to adopt sanctions against Libyan actors suspected of wanting to boycott the peace process..

From the end of 2015 onwards, the EU has also shown unwavering support for the government of Fayeze el-Sarraj when it was finally established. But Brussels will at the same time recognise the need to integrate Khalifa Haftar into the GNA. Haftar will never be subject to sanctions, unlike other personalities who, like him who, like him, opposed the UN peace process. This openness of the Union towards Haftar has never called into question support for Sarraj. Brussels has deployed two civilian and military crisis management missions to help strengthen the authorities in Tripoli: the naval mission EUNAVFOR MED "Sophia", designed to combat migrant smugglers (including by strengthening the capacity of the Libyan coastguard), and the EUBAM Libya mission to provide assistance in the field of border management.⁹

The EU Member States have broadly respected this approach developed at EU level. The UN mediation sought by Brussels

was supported without hesitation. Several countries (the UK, France, Italy, Germany and Spain) have taken the lead, Germany and Spain) exerted significant pressure on Tobruk and Tripoli to adopt a constructive attitude towards the UN-led peace negotiations.

However, this does not mean that the main EU countries have followed the same agenda in Libya. Their loyalty to the Sarraj government has been adapted and nuanced according to the circumstances. Behind the curtain of international fora, Indeed, the main EU capitals involved in Libya have adopted different attitudes towards Haftar, sometimes to the point of compromising European unity¹⁰.

b- The role The United States

When Donald Trump entered the White House, many observers believed that Washington would have openly turned its back on the GNA, to definitively side with the Tobruk coalition. At least two elements made this hypothesis credible. Firstly, the anti-Islamist rhetoric of Marshal Haftar was the kind that pleased the new occupant of the Oval Office. Secondly, as soon as he took office, the latter had spoken highly of Egyptian President al-Sissi, Khalifa Haftar's main sponsor

In December 2017, Donald Trump welcomed Prime Minister Fayeze el-Sarraj to the Oval Office¹¹, stating that he wanted to support the peace process initiated by the UN. Thus, for the United States, the interlocutor in Libya seems to be el-Sarraj and not Haftar¹².

However, one should not over-interpret these political positions of the United States. Apart from a few air strikes supposedly targeting terrorists in Libya their political and diplomatic involvement in the crisis has remained limited, as Washington as a low priority. The United States does not have key

economic and strategic interests in Libya, and prefers strategic interests in Libya, preferring to focus on other theatres, such as Ukraine, the Middle East, North Korea or the South China Sea.

In their view, in Libya, Europeans should shoulder their share of the security burden in security matters. Also, Washington remains in the background in this crisis, leaving its Old Continent allies free to do as they please.

c-The role of Egypt

Politically, Marshal Haftar is very close to President al-Sissi, who also holds the rank of Marshal. Both are the product of authoritarian military cultures; and both have a fierce hatred of jihadist movements and the Muslim Brotherhood.¹³

Abdel Fattah al-Sissi has every interest in supporting Haftar. At the international level, the legitimacy of the Egyptian president's power is based on the idea that no democracy can be built in collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood. Assimilated to a terrorist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood was harshly repressed in Egypt after al-Sissi toppled Mohamed Morsi from power to take his place. However, the thesis according to which the Muslim Brotherhood cannot be associated with a democratic project is contradicted in Tunisia, where the Ennahdha party, close to the Brotherhood, participates as best it can in the country's democratic process.

That is the problem. The attempt, led by the international community to obtain a peace agreement between Tripoli and Tobruk is in fact equivalent to promoting a agreement between movements close to the Muslim Brotherhood and the military-secular forces of Khalifa Haftar. It would be, considered as Tunisian-style scenario for Libya. This option is rather difficult to accept for the Egyptian regime, whose access to power was

based on an all-out war with the brotherhood¹⁴.

d- Turkey's role

From 2011 to 2018, Turkey, like all the actors interested in the Libyan crisis, tried to push its pawns while officially playing the game of a return to stability. Support for the 2015 Skhirat agreement providing for the return of a government in Tripoli in 2016, restarting trade relations within the limits allowed by the permanent instability in the country, welcoming Islamists in Turkey, some of whom have been converted to business, links with the Muslim Brotherhood and local militias, and the absence of legal proceedings against the Gaddafi family. Since December 2018, Turkey has sought to invest in the sector of military and security cooperation with Tripoli: the trip to Tripoli of the Turkish Chief of General Staff and the Minister of Defence was the occasion to announce, on 5 December, the signing of cooperation agreements. This visit concretely led to the arrival of a Turkish defence attaché in Tripoli in 2019¹⁵

The acceleration and deepening of the relationship is linked to Marshal Haftar's offensive to take Tripoli, which began on 4 April 2019, and which enjoys superiority in the field of equipment prompting the Tripoli NEG's political and military leaders to seek support support. In early May 2019, as Tripoli's forces came under heavy pressure in the south of the capital, a Libyan delegation from the capital, a Libyan delegation led by Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha and the commander of the "Volcano of Wrath" operation, Major General al-Jouweili, who is present in Ankara at the in Ankara at the IDEF arms fair to express the urgent need for equipment to counter Operation "Flood of Dignity" by Marshal Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA).¹⁶

At the end of May 2019, the first equipment (wheeled armoured personnel carriers and TB2) and Turkish advisers transported by a civilian ship disembarked at the docks of the port of Tripoli.

These drones carry out some spectacular strikes, notably spectacular strikes, notably at the beginning of August on the Joufrah air base (in the centre of the country) which was thought to be out of range.

These means were not enough to reverse the balance of power, which is very much in favour of forces of Marshal Haftar, supported in particular by the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, then Russia from September 2019. Several Turkish drones were destroyed in flight or on the ground and were only partially replaced due to logistical replaced only partially due to logistical difficulties.

On 26 November 2019, the signing of two Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between Tripoli and Ankara on military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime borders revealed The extent of Turkish ambitions in Libya and more widely in the Mediterranean. It caused a shift in the balance of power on the ground through Ankara's military commitment to the NEG, produced unprecedented tension in the Mediterranean (including between NATO members) and illustrated the aggressive policy of energy exploration that Turkey is pursuing in areas whose sovereignty it refuses to recognize.¹⁷

Today, the Turkish military presence presence in Libya remains significant. Ankara aims to become the main partner of this country in order to make it the bridgehead of Turkish influence on the African continent. Turkey relies on history, making Libya the missing link in the expansion of its economic and ideological influence to Africa. In the long run, Turkey

will have to take into account its ability to maintain its influence in the face of other international actors (notably Russia, China and the European Union) who are unhappy to see it gain such influence in Libya

e- The role of Russia

Faced with the uprisings in the Arab world, Russia has shifted from an attitude of understanding to one of distancing itself from the strategies adopted by the majority of Western and Arab states, first in the case of Libya but especially in the Syrian case. In its choices, Russian diplomacy is as much guided by regional strategic considerations (support to a long-standing partner, arms sales, as by major international stakes: believing that the protection of sovereignty is an essential factor of the stability of the international order, the Russian leaders refuse any idea of regime change imposed from outside. Not wanting to be influenced as in the Libyan case, they want to contain the extension of NATO's area of operation and dissuade any initiative that could create a precedent.¹⁸

9- Algerian diplomacy toward the Libyan crisis

In the wake of Algeria's diplomatic struggle, the Algerian government has drawn on the principles of the policy of non-alignment as the basis of its foreign policy. These principles reflect its militant and fighting vocation of yesterday and guarantee its national independence today. Algeria's non-alignment thus corresponds to the dual experience of armed struggle and national construction.

Algerian diplomacy drew its principles from the charters that led to the beginning of the Algerian revolution, such as the Declaration of 1 November 1954, the Soummam Platform (1956), the Tripoli Programme (1962), the Algiers Charter (1964) and the National

Charter (1976), these charters had several dimensions, including the Arab and African dimension.

Algerian diplomacy: a brief history

During the glorious Revolution of November 1954, Algerian diplomacy had waged, in parallel with the armed struggle, a diplomatic battle to raise the profile of the Algerian question in international fora.

This dynamic enabled Algeria, then under French occupation, to put the issue of its independence on the agenda of the UN for the first time in 1955, despite strong opposition from colonial France.

The year 1958 marked a turning point in Algeria's history and diplomacy when the UN adopted a resolution enshrining the Algerian people's right to self-determination, thus inflicting a crushing diplomatic defeat on France, which was, it should be recalled, a colonial power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. France, at the time, had considered the examination of this issue at the UN level as "a flagrant interference in France's internal affairs".

After independence, Algeria's diplomatic line has remained constant, obeying the same rules since the birth of the Algerian revolutionary state in the maquis: absolute respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation-states; non-interference in internal affairs; right to self-determination of peoples; intangibility of borders inherited from colonialism; diplomatic support and assistance to peoples struggling for their freedom and independence; diversification of economic relations; equidistance between blocs, especially in the era of non-alignment (something of this has always remained as the world is once again in the process of accelerated rebipolarization); offering good offices to resolve human crises (French

hostages in Lebanon, American hostages in Tehran...) and unnecessary and harmful conflicts between friendly countries, notably Iran and Iraq.

It was Algiers that brought the Shah and Saddam back together in 1975; it was also Algiers that strove to put an end to a war started between Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran, a mediation that thwarted Western and Israeli interests that had not ceased since the beginning of the conflict to weaken the two belligerents by renewing the fire each time the flames were weakening. A mediation that will cost the life, in 1982, to Mohamed Seddik Benyahia the brilliant Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time who was able to end the American hostage crisis in Iran in 1981¹⁹.

Algeria's approach to the Libyan crisis

Since the beginning of the crisis Algeria has called on the executive body of the UN to stop foreign interference and to boost the political process while recalling the significant impact of the situation in Libya on the stability of neighboring countries.

It has also consistently urged the Libyan parties to join the dialogue process, sponsored by the United Nations and accompanied by the African Union (AU), with a view to forming a government of national accord capable of managing the transition and rebuilding the institutions of the Libyan state in order to meet the challenges facing the Libyan people, including the fight against terrorism.

The first mechanism for the management of this crisis was created in Algiers in May 2014, on the sidelines of the Inter-Ministerial Conference of the neighboring countries to Libya, in its political and security dimension." "Algeria is therefore committed to a participatory resolution option of all Libyan actors from August 2014 on the

principles of our diplomacy on foreign policy²⁰

The solution must therefore be negotiated and not imposed by force of arms or by foreign parties, because the stability of not only the neighboring or border countries, but also the whole of Africa, the Arab world and the entire Mediterranean is at stake , that why Algeria has called for a clear roadmap, binding on the parties, aimed at stabilising the ceasefire, stopping the supply of weapons to the parties in order to remove the spectre of war from the whole region, but also to encourage the Libyan parties to sit down around the table to resolve the crisis through dialogue and peaceful means and thus avoid any slippage with disastrous consequences and to ensure that the parties are able to reach an agreement. Algeria is ready to host this expected dialogue between the Libyan brothers²¹.

Algeria believes that the region needs stability based on common security and attaches great importance to keeping the region free from foreign interference. Libya's security is an extension of its own security and the best way to preserve our regional security is through cooperation and mutual assistance with its neighbours in dealing with terrorism and extremism and other scourges

10-Conclusion

Algeria's voice has thus remained audible and respected in the concert of nations, as Algerian diplomacy has remained faithful to its principles and its line of conduct, namely the constancy of its positions and its categorical refusal to interfere in the internal affairs of countries.

Algeria's diplomatic actions and external relations with its partners are based on mutual respect, non-interference in internal affairs and active solidarity. These principles are rooted in the diplomatic action of our country

and have their roots in the proclamation of November 1, 1954 and the war of liberation.

as a conclusion Algerian diplomacy has distinguished itself throughout history by the constancy of its positions and the performance of its actions, which has given it a leading role in resolving crises and conflicts, and influencing decisions on an international scale, thus making Algeria an exporter of peace and stability, but also a leading country in the liberation movements and just causes.

Results and Recommendations for the Libyan parties:

1. Maintain efforts to create unified state institutions and structures through dialogue and peaceful means to avoid further potential peaceful means to avoid further potential fragmentation and partition of the country.
2. Greater visibility and more effective engagement of regional strategies and instruments by ensuring institutional continuity and work on the institutional continuity and work on ending fragmentation and the multiplication of stakeholders that impact on local and regional security issues.
3. More focus and work on security and defence structures in the regions based in Libya instead of focus on a single central structure in the first place. Paradoxically, Libya's security and defence sectors need to be rebuilt simultaneously using both bottom-up and top-down approaches.
4. The Libyan Government of National Accord must work to manage the border regions and local cross-border relations more effectively. This would prevent the continued operation of arms, drugs and this would prevent the continued operation of arms, drugs and human trafficking networks, as well as the proliferation of terrorist groups.

5. Launch a genuine national reconciliation process with effective confidence-building measures to pave the way for building the national army and police forces effectively.

Recommendations for the Algerian diplomacy:

Algeria, by virtue of its history, its weight and its central geographical location between Africa, the Arab world and the Mediterranean, will be more than ever committed to promoting initiatives, reconciliation dynamics and efforts to contribute to the solution of crises and conflicts in the region, such as the Western Sahara conflict, the Libyan crisis or the instability in the Sahel-Saharan region, as well as throughout the African continent, the Middle East and the Western Mediterranean basin

The deepening of the dialogue is necessary because of the changes and events in the world, but also because of the need to deal with peace and development issues in a concerted manner and in a spirit of solidarity. This is the only way to find viable and sustainable solutions to the challenges facing Algeria.

The creation of mixed working groups that include the services, academics, media and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that could

serve as a tool to help in the decision making process

Faced with the challenges of political or economic power relations, the national dimension remains fundamental in defining Algeria strategic vision.

The result is a dynamic posture that constitutes an important anchor point for Algeria security against the new risks of destabilization because of geopolitical recompositions in the world.

Strengthening border security through the establishment of surveillance, reconnaissance and deterrence systems, supported by a hardening of the level of integrated national vigilance against the threats that threaten the country.

The improvement of intelligence work and analysis and must be accompanied by diplomatic actions of scale to become a key player in geopolitical circles that interest our country.

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