

The reality of Political Islam streams within the Maghreb regimes after 2011

واقع تيارات الإسلام السياسي داخل الأنظمة المغربية بعد 2011

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Abstract :

The process of examining the most important transformation paths in the Maghreb after 2011 period leads to the need to review several important points, which may sometimes intersect with attempts at democratic transition in some countries, and may differ in others, such as in the case of security chaos and instability. It is known by other regions, all of which have never been known to the Maghreb since its occupation. Here we find it necessary to ask questions about the reality of the currents of political Islam within the Maghreb regimes, and how they dealt with the fundamental raised issues.

The article includes in the beginning a review of the most important literature that dealt with the issue of political Islam in the Maghreb, as well as the development of the concept of political Islam and the growth of parties that adopt this concept in political practice, and among the findings of the article that political Islam parties still find it difficult to market For her ideas and strengthening her presence in the Maghreb regimes, the best evidence is what she was exposed to after 2011, and here the experiences vary and differ from country to country.

Keywords: Political Islam streams, Maghreb regimes, Maghreb region, Arab spring.

ملخص:

إن عملية فحص أهم مسارات التحولات في المنطقة المغربية خلال فترة ما بعد 2011، تقودنا إلى ضرورة مراجعة العديد من النقاط المهمة التي قد تتقاطع أحياناً مع محاولات الانتقال الديمقراطي في بعض البلدان، وقد تختلف في نقاط أخرى كما هو الحال في حالة الفوضى الأمنية وعدم الاستقرار التي تعرفها مناطق أخرى، و كل هذه حالات لم يسبق لها وأن عرفتها المنطقة المغربية منذ فترة احتلالها. وهنا نجد أنه من الضروري طرح تساؤلات متعلقة بواقع تيارات الإسلام السياسي داخل الأنظمة المغربية، وكيف تعاملت مع القضايا الأساسية المطروحة.

يتضمن المقال في البداية عرضاً لأهم الأدبيات التي تناولت موضوع الإسلام السياسي في المنطقة المغربية، كما يتعرض إلى تطور مفهوم الإسلام السياسي ونمو الأحزاب التي تتبنى هذا المفهوم في الممارسة السياسية، ومن ضمن ما توصل إليه المقال أن أحزاب الإسلام السياسي مازالت تجد صعوبة في التسويق لأفكارها وتعزيز

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تواجهها في الأنظمة المغاربية، وأحسن دليل هو ما تعرضت له بعد سنة 2011، وهنا تتباين التجارب وتختلف من دولة إلى أخرى.
كلمات مفتاحية: تيارات الإسلام السياسي، الأنظمة المغاربية، المنطقة المغاربية، الربيع العربي.

I- Introduction:

In recent years, the political situation in the Maghreb countries has reflected many problems and dilemmas that threaten to destroy the national structure of the state in the Libyan situation. Besides, it menaces the tendency to maintain its collapse, as well as the obstacles and real challenges to the pathways of democratic transition, especially the Tunisian experience as the cradle of Arab spring. Moreover, the test of the state of political stability stands cautious in the light of the dilemma of the political success of the current president. The experience of incomplete democracy supported by the military establishment in Mauritania is also facing a difficult test due to the nature of the relationship between the regime and the opposition. In Morocco, the Political situation is suffering from multiple deficiencies.

The paper aims to monitor the most important tracks of transformations in the Maghreb region during the period following 2011, by focusing on important points that may sometimes intersect with democratic transition attempts in some countries, and may differ in other points as is the case of security chaos and instability in other regions. These are unprecedented cases that have not been recognized by the Maghreb region and its political viability since its occupation. Accordingly, the problem is as follows: How can the internal transformations in the Maghreb be read in the light of the secretions of the Arab movement in 2011?

II - Islamic streams concept and employment:

One of the most important studies to be noted is Francois Burgat, ‘‘**Islam in the Southern Maghreb, Voice of the South**’’, 1988, he addressed the Islamic movements in the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya), how political Islam was born as an alternative project, and the factors that helped it, focusing on the FIS in Algeria and the Islamic Youth Association in Morocco.

A study by Georges El Rassi entitled ‘‘**Algerian Islam from Emir Abdelkader to the Emirs of Communities**’’ through which the author linked all events and developments since the establishment of the Algerian state with Emir Abdelkader' to the period of the of President Lamine Zeroual and the status of the Islamic religion and its role in those developments, this study is predominantly informational and historical narration of events.

Mohamed Darif's book, ‘‘**Political Islam in Morocco: A documentary approach**’’, Rabat: Dar Al-Maaref Al-Jadidah (1992), which focuses on the conditions of the emergence of Islamic movements in Morocco, and the study of Mohammed Saleh al-Karawi entitled ‘‘**The Islamic Movement in Morocco: Development, Prospects and Prospects**’’, 2007, the researcher highlighted the emergence and differentiation of Islamic movements and the most important revisions they have gone through.

Bashir Al-Mutai's study titled ‘‘**The Islamic Movement and Political Participation in Morocco (Tawhid Movement and Reform Movement and the Justice and Development**

Party as a Model) ‘, 2009, in which the researcher dealt with how the Islamic Movement deals with the issue of political participation in terms of originality and reference and what is the nature as well as what are the characteristics of its political behavior through the political practice of the Justice and Development Party.

A group of authors, ‘**The Islamists, Issues of Citizenship and Citizenship**’, 2017, comprising 18 diverse studies, between ‘**The Dialectic of the Conflict over the Religious and Civilian Nature of the State in Morocco**’ and ‘**The State in the Perspective of Islamic Discourse: Reading in the Discourse with the State**’ It shows the deep incentives for the growth of social demand for Islam, and the interpretation of its dynamics, movement, and goals, what Islamic movements are, their true constituents, the source of their political growth, their content and prospects for their development.

The book also includes another study entitled ‘**The problem of establishing the system of government in contemporary Islamic thought between privacy and universality: research in methodologies and challenges**’ in which the researcher tried to study the possibility of establishing an Islamic civil state, or Islamic democratic system, combining the values of Islam; Justice, equality, religious freedom, humanism, etc., and the values of global political modernity based on democracy, rationality, social contract, individualism, citizenship and others.

The term "Islamic streams" is one of the most difficult terms to define in terms of its scope, and the creation of a comprehensive definition that prevents it because of the multiplicity of ideological visions of the scholars and those concerned with the Islamic question. This is why the conceptual dictionary of the latter has become.

The majority of these terms are based on the positions of the Islamic streams of the interests and ideas they belong to, rather than reflect the reality of these streams because the users of these names are parties to the social, political and cultural conflict that revolves around their Islamic societies. During these terms, they express their rejection or acceptance of the latter. Because of this confusion between terminology and labels, it is necessary to define the term Islamic streams objectively as a central definition of the study, starting from the definition of the conceptual framework among them the various labels that have been called, to remove confusion and overlap between them.

II.1. Islamic fundamentalism:

The resource dictionary defines the doctrine of infallibility, a movement known by Protestantism in the 20th century, which the bible is infallible, not only in matters of faith and morality but also in history and unseen matters, such as the creation and the birth of Christ. The Oxford dictionary defines it as a traditional orthodox stream based on an anti-liberal concept (Dictionary Oxford, 1999, p.336).

Based on the two previous definitions, this term is the first manifestation of the West. It was called a group of Protestants opposed to liberalism, totally dependent on the literal interpretation of the Scriptures and returning to it (Radwan Ahmad, 2005, p.21). It calls for the necessity of invoking a religious source of authority, thus eliminating the cognitive accumulation that the Christian generations and aims to establish a state of priesthood such as that practiced by the church in the Middle ages, and this can be described as a movement of a static nature, unlike the streams.

What is noticeable is that there is a clear difference between Islamic and fundamentalist streams and this term was called on the Islamic political streams, in an attempt from the West to link the latter with Christian fundamentalism with all its negative aspects that have been corrupted in the American conscience in particular, and the Christian west in general, a term that refers to intellectual backgrounds linked to the meaning the western recipient when the term Islamic fundamentalism arrives, his conceptual reference will resort to that church history, which is linked to the suppression of European scientific and human progress, and hence it has rigid and backward connotations of Islam, the history of Islam fundamentalism is not known through the stages of development of Islamic societies about contemporary Islamic streams.

II. 2. Islamic and Salafist movements:

The Salafists are meant to follow the approach taken by the predecessor of the nation from the first centuries, in the issues of belief and its origins as in the Qur'an and Sunnah (Sulaiman Hreitani, 2000, p.355). The word Salafism is used to refer to the reform movement of the nineteenth century, (1849-1905), and Rashid Rida (1860-1935). The vision of these Salafis and their intellectual productions was a historical gateway to the mobilization of contemporary Islamic streams (Muhammad al-Sayyid, 1999, p.10).

Islamic extremism and radicalism mean extremism that transcends moderation and stands on the sidelines away from the center. Political extremism means the individual and collective call for radical change in the country's political, economic and social system, which is not limited to Islamic streams. It should be distinguished from violence as an emergency method necessitated by certain circumstances and as part of the ideology of the Islamic streams (Abdel Hadi Boutaleb, 2004, p.33). The group of extremism represents only a small marginal segment within the Islamic streams.

The political violence is not only Islamic streams, because reality shows that political violence is the only thing that is equal to all, and what is called religious violence or religious extremism hides behind the violence practiced by the regimes, against their Islamist opponents, to close the doors to reach the political arena in a legitimate way, which in turn leads them to violence to justify their use of counter-violence and repression to protect their entity.

III. Islamic movements and political Islam:

Political Islam was used as a media term to describe Islamic streams, which became popular after the events of September 11, 2001. The use of this term in western analysis led to the non-discrimination between Islam as a major religion and social movements, Islam is based on it, and the politicization of Islam implicitly understood that there are many and varied Islam (Mohamed Fathi, 1991, p.52).

The Islamic streams in Algeria and Morocco, and even in the Arab and Muslim world, are not a single bloc. Rather, they include several attitudes, attitudes, and perceptions that reach the point of contradictions in some cases. And this is the beginning of the debate about what Islam imposed and what it does not impose, and it is often a victory of opinion or direction because of the support of social forces which is more influential, and therefore Islamic

movements will be considered as social movements in political societies aimed at social change, based on rejecting the existing political and social conditions and considering them to be outside of Islam.

The study of the Islamic streams in this concept means that they will focus on being influential forces in the society with their goals and strategies, and are influenced by the circumstances surrounding them (Magdi Hammad, 2001, p.298). They are part of the social and political conflict but they use religious language and symbolism and are based on a cultural stock dominated by religion, the Islamic streams and social movements are subject to the law of evolution, which bear the specificities of the societies in which they were created, influenced by their environment, and which they do (Farid Abdel Karim, 1997, p.128).

IV. Classification of Islamic streams:

There are several criteria for the classification of Islamic streams such as political perceptions, and methods of mobility, but the intellectual side is misleading the basic rule and according to many ratings, Islamic streams are divided into:

1. Islamic religious movements: These are the ones that look at individuals, nations, and societies from the validity of the faith only. They interpret the Quranic texts and the prophetic traditions in a literal manner based on the general rule of the word rather than on the reason for which they were revealed or mentioned in context. The launching of hasty provisions for the expiration of nations and the legitimacy of societies, and the reading of the reality of contemporary societies in the light of the experience of the first Islamic era, and the era of prophecy.

Depending on how they deal with societies, we find two categories (Ibrahim Al-Najjar , 2006, pp.20-22):

A: Extremist peaceful streams: These streams agree that contemporary societies are closer to the situation of the pre-Islamic and infidel society in Mecca after the Prophet's mission and migration to the city, and on this period it is considered that it is not yet time to work in politics, build an Islamic state. Depending on how they deal with societies, we find two categories:

- **The streams of takfir and migration:** You see that contemporary societies resemble the community of Mecca before migration, where no longer hope to be guided to Islam, and no longer include only the unbelievers, and therefore must be abandoned as the only Muslims on earth, and those who did not join them is an infidel, they have completely abandoned society by leaving it in waiting for God to show his religion.

- **Re-advocacy streams:** contemporary societies resemble the community of Mecca after the mission of the Prophet, where the re-invitation of existing people, who are ignorant of Islam as the unbelievers in Mecca ignorant, and the only task they must do as the first Muslims without the isolation of communities and migration or violent confrontation with them.

B - violent jihadist streams: the stage of the world today can be compared to the stage of the migration of Islam to the city, and according to this the current societies and countries have returned to the stage of ignorance, and therefore must be re-islamization of the latter, and re-established on the same rules that founded on it, Medina, and Jihad is the only means to have to achieve those goals, and the result of the different regions and conditions of origin of these movements, they were divided into two parts:

- **Local streams:** which are found almost only in the countries of the Islamic world, based on the idea that the enemy close to the first fighting from the distant enemy, which is the governments of the countries to which they belong.

- **International streams field:** different from the movements of local character in the priority of fighting, they see that the distant enemy fighting first from the enemy near, despite the agreement with them in the consideration of the enemy near, and from here adopts the concept of external jihad, against those who believe that they are enemies of Islam, streams in particular during the last ten years in many regions of the world (such as what is now called al Qaeda).

V. Reasons for the re-emergence of Islamic streams:

The return of religion to the political field has reasons, including:

First: the reality of the cultural composition of the Arab society, where the religious idea occupies a prominent position in the system of general ideas prevailing, a site that has not changed much of the cultural modernization events that have taken place since our societies collided with western civilization. Arab societies have remained adhering to their religion despite the emergence of a class or elite defending western culture, but the latter's access to the dilemma of the value vacuum, made it certain that the Arab Muslim societies were right to uphold the values and the defense of their religion whenever they feel they are attacking in the depth of their identity, so we find religious leaders always have a privileged position within these communities.

These movements often arise and manifest the result of injustice and oppression practiced by the ruling authorities and the sense of marginalization and exclusion that often lead to alienation (or indifference) or join violent movements due to poor distribution of wealth and the spread of corruption. On the other hand, these religious movements seek to attract everyone who is convinced.

Secondly, the political issue has always been fundamental in Islam and has not been carried out by contemporary Islamic streams called political Islam and religious relations as well as different forms of religious doctrines.

Various aspects of the occupation were confronted by the combination of national and religious elements in the formation of the political conscience of the Arab nation occupied, at the beginning of the occupation active resistance under the banner of jihad and led by sheikhs testifies to the meeting and the religious status in their communities.

Thirdly, for the religious return to the reality of political and social life is the existence of objective economic, social and political reasons, which imposes many on the investment of religious capital and its recruitment in the political conflict, or in the direction of the establishment of Islamic protest movements political content and religious form.

And that there is a need for a religious government to establish the Islamic system and that jihad is an absent duty to be returned to the enemies of the Islamic trend of rulers and thinkers and that it is necessary to apply Islamic law and not to wage war on society. And that there is only the Islamic solution to face all the problems of national and international society, and that the Muslim should not have any nationality accept Islam, he should not have loyalty to his homeland but to the Muslim community.

We can also add some analysis of the causes of the growing Islamic movements as follows:

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1. The pressures of poverty, underdevelopment, and unemployment, and the lack of opportunities for social immigration, especially among urban youth and rural migrant groups. It is known that the Arab labor force is growing at record rates, and unemployment rates are higher than the world average. Lack of investment and deterioration of services lead to more poverty and political and social unrest, especially in rural areas and slums, which widen the membership of religious streams.
2. The system of prevailing social patterns and values is shaken by international changes (cultural invasion, information revolution or globalization).
3. Weak educational and educational curricula, and decline of institutions and academic activities, especially about Islamic education, history, and civic or civic education and Arabic. There is no single country in the Arab world whose educational system aims to create a human being.
4. Lack of political, religious and jurisprudential expertise among most elements of jihadist movements, who are recruited at an early age. Religious streams generally take care of young people to bring them into the movement early.
5. The diversity of religious texts, and the contradictions of the views of scholars and interpreters, and the dominance of personal tendencies and partisan policies on the trends of devising judgments, especially those related to the jihad and takfir, and the attitude of power, book, and Shura. Thus, it is open to the emergence of dozens of Islamic parties and movements, each of which claims to represent true Islam. These interpretations often result in extreme violence and extremism against men, women, and children of the general population - Muslim or non-muslim - as in Egypt and Algeria.

VI. Streams of political Islam in the Maghreb region :

The year 2011 certainly made a lasting impression, constituting a turning point in the Arab - Muslim world, the victim of many decades of immobility in governance. Deprived of political participation and economic well-being, the “Arab streets,” from Tunis to Sana’a, as well as Tripoli, Damascus and Cairo, have let their anger explodes, causing a surge of protest – a major tsunami – sweeping away the hereditary, clannish dictatorships that were considered rock-solid one by one (Karim Sader, 2012). However, the enthusiasm and hopes associated with this wave of revolt called the Arab spring soon gave way to numerous questions and even a certain disillusionment largely linked to the progress of Islamists at the polls, placing 2012 under the sign of uncertainty.

Emerging from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the pan-Islamist organization established in Egypt at the beginning of the 20th century before spreading to the rest of the Arab world, the category of moderate Islamist party presently constitutes the main, dominant force on the new political stage emerging from the Arab Spring uprisings. These movements, represented by Ennahda in Tunisia, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in Morocco and the freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt, have all chosen the Turkish AKP model, borrowing terms referring to the notions of “development”, “justice” and “freedom” for their names. Moreover, everything would lead to believe that these same movements will rise to power in Libya, and even in Syria, should the uprising against Bashar al-Assad’s alawi regime be successful.

Though the Arab springs have led to the emergence of a transnational dynamic Islamist comprised by parties sharing a common ideology and the experience of repression in the era of the dictatorships, our analytical framework in this phase of democratic transition must

certainly take into account the particularities and local issues, which differ from one country to another. The result of varying national experiences, Islamist movements have evolved in distinct political circumstances and particular contexts. In other words, the Islamist rise to power after the wave of protests is far from homogeneous, since these parties must currently interact with other players, election results not always in a clear-cut majority.

The set of these moderate Islamist parties has chosen to follow the democratic model and the principle of plurality in the political sphere. Such an orientation is also related to the fact that in many cases, they won recent legislative elections only by a small margin, requiring them to coexist with other liberal, secular and/or progressive parties. Moreover, they are in favor of economic liberalism, demonstrating a certain capacity to compromise insofar as respect for religious dogma with a view to the requirements of good economic governance, which takes the form of “real Islamism” at a time when these countries need to recover from several months of protests that have paralyzed and ruined their economy.

Across North Africa, popular uprisings created an unprecedented opening for opposition groups from across the political spectrum to finally take part in governing their respective countries. Of all these actors, Islamist parties were best able to capitalize on the opening, with the justice and development party (PJD), Ennahda, and the Muslim brotherhood’s freedom and justice party (FJP) winning significant electoral victories in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, respectively.

When the 2010–11 uprisings started, the MB, PJD, and Ennahda did not initially join for fear of repression, though many Islamists, including members of these groups, did so. However, as the uprisings gained momentum in each country, the MB and Ennahda (as well as some additional members of the PJD), joined the fray.

Seven years later, the PJD has again won a plurality in Morocco’s parliament, Ennahda is a junior partner in Tunisia’s governing coalition, and the Muslim Brotherhood, removed from power by Egypt’s military, is enduring a severe crackdown. While their actions and fates greatly differed, all three groups’ time in government since 2011 shed light on the parties’ stances in various areas. These “gray zones” include their ideologies, commitment to pluralism, and respect for women’s and minority rights.

There was a great deal of uncertainty -and consternation- about how each group’s Islamist ideology would manifest. Ultimately, however, none of the PJD, Ennahda, and the MB declared the establishment of Islamic states or the strict application of Sharia following their acquisition of power. It is also notable that neither the PJD nor Ennahda made a serious push to review existing legislation or revise lawmaking processes on religious grounds (Bill Hess, 2018, p.02). All three groups, now recast as leading political parties, still emphasized the importance of adhering to an Islamic frame of reference. However, they demonstrated that they are not fundamentally maximalist when it comes to their political pursuit of more Muslim states and societies.

The follower of the issue about the political integration in the Maghreb can discover that there is a general trend towards strengthening the assimilation of the currents of political Islam under the umbrella of the ruling regimes and finding separate areas between them and the armed religious currents along the lines of the organization of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. If the Maghreb's assimilations style takes up larger areas, whether the Alliance of the Islamists or power in Morocco or Tunisia, these areas are shrinking and more restricted in Algeria and Mauritania, while the Libyan situation is unique in its war.

VII. Political Islam streams and political action in the Arab Maghreb:

The general observation is the pragmatic approach and flexibility that characterized the performance of the parties of political Islam in the countries of the region, perhaps because the regional environment has witnessed a decline in the state of escalation experienced by the current political Islam after the Arab mobility.

In Tunisia, for example, we witnessed a consensus between the Islamic Renaissance Movement and the Authority after it came in second place. It won 69 seats in the October 2014 parliamentary elections, which were issued by the Netae Tunis Party with 86 seats, without an absolute majority other than the two rounds of elections in November and December 2014, in which the leader of the Tunisian Appeal Party won the Tunisian Call for his fair rival Marzouki, and the Nahdha movement also participated in the government coalition announced in February 2015 headed by Habib al-Sayad.

It is also possible to see how Tunisian President Al-Sebsi, since his assumption of the presidency, has managed to maintain an area of harmony with the Islamic renaissance movement in 2015. He sought to adopt a policy that reflects the general national orientation, especially that the disturbing signs of electoral entitlements on the regional bases between the coastal states and the north, which acquired the fruits of development in the previous eras and also sided with President Al-Sebsi, the marginalized south and the tendency of the Islamists, which appeared to support some of the poor northern areas of Marzouki. This does not eliminate any indicators of compatibility (renaissance presidency). In November 2015, al-Nahdha supported the government's economic reconciliation bill to exempt businessmen involved in corruption under the Ben Ali regime, resume their activities provided they returned the money they had seized and defended the emergency law and terrorism (Aurélie Campana, 2018).

In terms of the internal circumstances of the Moroccan situation, the AKP was able in 2015 to strengthen partnership with the authority that began after the post-movement phase in February 2011, when King Mohammed VI announced a campaign for political reforms (F. Jensenius, 2010, p.132). This last resulted in constitutional reforms and parliamentary elections that allowed the rise of justice and development party with an Islamic orientation led by the government coalition, followed by the local and regional elections on 4 September 2015 to devote the public line in the Moroccan policy to absorb the opposition, including Islamic currents.

In the Algerian case, Mezrag (commander of the so-called Islamic Rescue Army) announced in August 2015 that the establishment of a new party under the name of the Algerian Front for Rescue and Reconciliation had been initiated after benefiting from the presidential pardon in 2000. The issue of the extent of the Algerian regime's ability to absorb the Islamists within the Algerian party system after the rejection of its license is again mentioned. Here, the statement of the former Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sallal can be invoked on September 3, 2015, when he said that those whose hands were stained with blood could not be allowed to establish a political party. The first time that leaders are trying and the crews of the Rescue Front returned to the political scene through the establishment of a political party. Before that, Mezrag tried to do so in October 2012 when he announced the establishment of a charity comprising elements of the 'Islamic Rescue Army' who descended from the mountains, but his endeavor was rejected.

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Five years earlier, Mezrag and Rabah Kebir and Mustapha Kartali, who were prominent leaders of the Front and the Rescue Army, initiated a new political party but were shocked by a repulsive political reality. On the one hand, and on the other hand, some Islamic parties, especially the Movement for a Society of Peace, disengaged from power, refusing to participate in the government or the presidential elections in 2014, and sought to join with other liberal and secular political movements to build an opposition front called Freedoms and democratic transition in April 2014 to push the Algerian regime to rewrite a transitional path.

In Libya it is somewhat complicated, given the existence of overlapping relations between the movement of political and armed Islam, which led to the weakness of the results achieved by this trend in the elections, especially the Justice and Construction Party in the parliamentary elections in June 2014 which won 20. It has led the party to a position behind the militias of Dawn of Libya and Macerata and the General National Congress and the parallel government of Tripoli. The performance of the Islamic trend especially - the Justice and Construction Party - appeared in 2015 more flexible and pragmatic support for the Dawn of Libya forces in its struggle. Additionally, the support of the efforts of the peaceful settlement led by the United Nations envoy to Libya has been criticized by his partners in western Libya, especially in the alliance Dawn of Libya forces in March 2015, after participating in the meetings of the national dialogue. However, the Justice and Construction Party was one of the signatories of the peace agreement initials in the Moroccan city of Skhirat in July 2015.

In Mauritania, the regime is betting on the politics of ambivalence with the Islamists (between the authorities and the opposition) in stabilizing the process of political assimilation. For example, the Islamic Union Party for Reform and Development participated in parliamentary and municipal councils in 2013. As a result, it won 16 seats in the parliamentary elections to take second place and lead the opposition, while the ruling party (Union for the Republic) won half the seats in parliament.

The path of the Islamists in Mauritania and their relations with the regimes, civil or military, is a multi-track and diverse process. The relationship between the Islamists in Mauritania and the successive regimes has been characterized by more tension than the flexibility. The most prominent political map in Mauritania is the diversity of parties, groups, that the National Rally for Reform and Development party 'Tawasol, affiliated with the Muslim Brothers, remains one of the most prominent in the level of rhetoric, performance and influence. At the start of the Arab spring wave, the Islamists aligned themselves with the Mauritanian opposition movements for demanding the departure of Ould Abdel Aziz's regime. The movement was so discouraged that Islamists returned to the regime to participate in the local and legislative elections. However, the apprehension continued to imprint the position of authority on the Islamists in their proximity or distance from them. The choice of anticipation and tension is the most prominent characteristic of the current relationship between the Islamists and the regime of Ould Abdel Aziz with the possibility of sliding towards the option of confrontation, especially since the choice of alliance and normalization is ruled out by the past of relations and the unstable confidence between the two parties: the authority and the Islamists.

VIII .Conclusion:

After the Islamic movements underwent difficult experiences with the ruling regimes in a period of secrecy and opposition by various peaceful and armed means, which made them in a collision with them, the acceleration of international and internal political transformations in the early nineties of the last century produced a different political climate in both countries. This last opened the way for Islamic movements To participate in political life gradually, and to accept the rules of the democratic game, and considers the national reform movement in Algeria, and the movement of unification and reform, which development is politically active through the Justice and Development Party in Morocco, among the Islamic movements that have committed itself to impose itself on the political arena of both countries by adopting the option of participation and violence. This raises several questions about the nature of this participation.

In general, there are indications of the ability of the ruling Maghreb regimes - except the Libyan one - to the relative extent of the interplay between crises and the relative assimilation of one country to another, as economic reform policies may result in social protests, especially as they do not.

In Tunisia, on the one hand, the influence of the growing terrorist organizations appears to be continuing, especially after the escalation of the effects of terrorism politically and economically, especially after the allegiance of the Oqba Ibn Nafi al-Fihri battalion to the ISIS organization. On the other hand, there seems to be a capacity for the Tunisian political system to absorb balanced political Islam, the consensus between the Islamic Renaissance Movement and the regime. Nevertheless, there are strikes and protests, especially in the South. In Algeria, there are limited effects of terrorist organizations under the security policy applied by the Algerian military and security services, but at the political level, we find that the dilemma of the political succession remains on the table and has its impact on the political reality. In Morocco, there is a limited influence on the rise of terrorist organizations under security policies to dismantle cells targeting recruitment in poor areas.

There seems to be an authoritarian partnership between the movements of political Islam and power more balanced and stable in local and regional elections. In Libya, this is happening despite the fact that the drafts of the Libyan agreement included the absorption of the parties of political Islam, the deterioration of living due to the armed conflict and the decline in oil production, but this did not prevent the existence of splits and differences on the October agreement and the proposed government.

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