Journal of innovative applied mathematics and computational sciences
Volume 4, Numéro 1, Pages 26-48
2024-09-25
Collaboration And Authority In The Collective Action Problem
Authors : Mehrad Ahmad Ali .
Abstract
Direct reciprocation and contingent collaboration deter opportunistic behavior in social predicaments. However, in large collectives, these mechanisms may lose efficacy as they rely on individuals' influence. Zero-determinant strategies in the collective action problem reshape our understanding of individual influence. Our study introduces a theoretical framework extending these strategies to multiplayer dilemmas, offering insights into lone participants' impact. We delineate intriguing sub-classes of strategies: fair, extortionate (advantageous), and generous (disadvantageous). We explore models showcasing strategic enhancement through alignment with others. The present study elucidates the significance of individual decision-making and collective coordination as essential components contributing to favorable outcomes within expansive group settings.
Keywords
Coordination, Alliances, Cooperation, Public Goods Game.
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